

A

000490105

4



UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



UCSB LIBRARY

X-25090



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

ANTHROPOLOGY.

Dr. Burney's Works.

Atonement and Law Reviewed. 12mo. 240 pages. Price \$1.25. An able review of Dr. Armour's Atonement and Law. Dr. Burney vigorously combats the substitutionary theory.


Psychology. 550 pages. Cloth. Price \$1.75. The discussion divided into (I) Intellect, (II) Sensibility, (III) Will. Adopted by several schools.

Moral Science. 12mo. Cloth. 402 pages. Price \$1.50. Everywhere commended as a work of merit.

Soteriology. 400 pages. Price \$1.50. A forceful statement of the author's views upon the atonement.

Anthropology. Price \$1.25. Edited by R. W. Binkley.

To be published at early day: CHRISTOLOGY AND MEDIATION, and DOCTRINES OF GRACE.



ANTHROPOLOGY.

A DISCUSSION CHIEFLY OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL; OF MAN AS A
SINNER; THE RELATION OF THE FIRST MAN AND HIS
POSTERITY; SIN AND PHYSICAL EVIL, ETC.

BY S. G. BURNEY, D.D., LL.D.,

Late Professor of Systematic Theology in Cumberland University.

NASHVILLE, TENN.:
CUMBERLAND PRESBYTERIAN PUBLISHING HOUSE.
1894.

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

The name of S. G. Burney upon the title-page of this book is a sufficient guarantee of its merit. The work is given to the public because the author's candid and scholarly discussion of the subjects treated cannot fail to be helpful to every student who seeks clear, rational and scriptural views upon Anthropology. This volume is published in the discharge of a trust committed to me by the author and in response to the demand of those who were students of Theology under him, as well as of others who appreciate his ability and value his teachings.

The editor acknowledges gratefully the valuable assistance rendered by Rev. C. H. Bell, D.D., and Rev. B. G. Mitchell, A.M.

R. W. BINKLEY.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.	Origin of the Mind or Soul, - - - -	1
Section 1.	Pre-existentism - . - - -	2
Section 2.	Creationism, - - - - -	4
Section 3.	Traducianism, - - - - -	8
CHAPTER II.	Imputation, - - - - -	16
CHAPTER III.	Sin, - - - - -	27
Section 1.	The terms used to give us the idea of sin, -	28
Section 2.	Sin considered as lawlessness, - - -	34
Section 3.	The ground of sovereignty, - - - -	37
CHAPTER IV.	Sin (continued), - - - - -	53
CHAPTER V.	Sin (continued), - - - - -	67
Section 1.	Sin as an act, - - - - -	67
Section 2.	Sin as a state, - - - - -	68
Section 3.	Sin as a state subjects us to punishment, -	74
Section 4.	The relation of sin and its punishment, -	75
Section 5.	Sin and its pardon, - - - - -	78
CHAPTER VI.	The Relation of Sin to Natural or Physi- cal Evil, - - - - -	83
Section 1.	Does sin sustain a casual relation to all evil, physical as well as moral? - - - -	83
Section 2.	Are death and all human sufferings penal? -	88
CHAPTER VII.	The Relation of Sin to Natural or Physi- cal Evil (continued), - - - - -	103
CHAPTER VIII.	Sin, Transgression and Iniquity, - - -	122
CHAPTER IX.	Life and Death, - - - - -	134
CHAPTER X.	Necessitated Virtue; or, Holiness and Probation, - - - - -	154
CHAPTER XI.	General Conclusions, - - - - -	170

PREFATORY NOTE.

One learned and greatly beloved author, who lately passed to the spirit-land where all mysteries are unfolded to his inquiring mind, left in the form of lectures to the Theological classes of Cumberland University, the contents of the following pages, wherein the essential facts relating to the perplexing problem of sin, especially the moral relation of the first man and his children, seem to be more fully harmonized than in any discussion hitherto published. With characteristic modesty, he does not claim to have obviated all difficulties, but he has certainly thrown a flood of light thereon, and in a scholarly and masterly manner vindicated the ways of God, presenting a theory free from absurdities. The reader will be interested and instructed as the author tersely and successfully supports his positions by scripture proofs and by inductive logic.

C. H. BELL.

INTRODUCTORY.

Anthropology is literally the doctrine of man. Man is a complex being of numerous relationships. Anthropology, in its most comprehensive sense, treats of man in all the essential and accidental characteristics of his being, and in his diversified relationships.

I. It treats of him as an animal and sensuous being, and of his relations as such to the lower animals, to his own species, and to his Creator and Supreme Benefactor.

II. It treats of him as a rational being, possessing intellect, reason, judgment, understanding; also sensibilities, affections, desires, and emotions; also freedom and volitional powers.

III. It treats of him as an æsthetical being, capable of a sense of the beautiful, of enjoying pleasure from the contemplation of the works of nature and art; also of apprehending and enjoying the grand or sublime in the realms of matter, mind, and morals.

IV. It treats of him as a moral being, capable of a sense of moral distinctions of right and wrong, of a sense of obligation to his Maker and his neighbor; also capable of moral retribution through the consciousness of right and wrong doing.

V. It treats of him as a religious being, capable of a knowledge of God as the Supreme Object of reverence, love, and obedience; also capable of knowing himself as a devout, reverent, and obedient child and worshiper of God; also capable of knowing himself as a sinner, a willful rebel against God, with a heart sensual and devilish, not subordinate to God nor

able to give himself a new and better nature, or to deliver himself from his opposition to God, or from the fearful consequences of his moral corruption and guilt.

Of the first, second, third and fourth of these several aspects or departments of Anthropology, I have previously treated in a brief and somewhat informal way in Psychology and Ethics. To the fifth Division, particularly the last part of it, viz., man as a sinner, and to the doctrine of salvation by grace, the following pages are devoted.

Before proceeding with the discussion proposed, it may be both interesting and instructive to bring under review certain theories presented by Christian writers in regard to the origin of the mind or soul.

CHAPTER I.

ORIGIN OF THE MIND OR SOUL.

MAN is called a rational animal. What distinguishes him from all other animals and elevates him immensely above them is the possession of a rational and an immortal spirit or soul. Of the origin of the genus *homo* we have a very brief account in Genesis. "And God said, Let us make man in our image after our likeness. So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him ; male and female created he them. And the Lord formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul."

This is by far the most reasonable and satisfactory account that we have of the origin of our bodies. It leaves us no ground for doubt. It, however, gives us no decisive information as to the origin of the spirit, soul or mind, except it was given by God. It does not tell us whether the mind had existence prior to the body, and was breathed into it upon its formation ; or whether it was newly created and united to the body when the body was formed ; or whether it was strictly a concreation of the body. The exact meaning of the words, "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life," is not quite certain.

What life is meant? The life of the body or that of the spirit, or both? The words, "he became a living soul," are alike ambiguous. Does soul here mean animal life, as it often does, or does it mean the immortal spirit? These texts do not definitely settle the question of the origin of the soul, except that it comes from God. No other texts throw any material light on the subject. Ecc. iii. 21, xii. 7, Job xii. 10, Isaiah xlii. 5, are sometimes appealed to by disputants, but it is generally conceded that they give no clue to a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. (The question is manifestly a philosophical rather than a biblical one.) It is generally discussed, however, by writers on Systematic Theology. This is done chiefly because of its supposed bearing on the hotly contested doctrine of Original Sin. Different persons, however, holding the same theological creed disagree as to the origin of the soul.

The principal hypotheses that have been supported by Christian writers are Pre-existentism, Creationism, and Traducianism.

SEC. I. — *Pre-existentism*.—Pythagoras, Plato with some of his followers, and some of the Cabalists among the Jews taught that God, in the beginning of the world, created all souls that have been or may be connected with human bodies, one of which unites with a human body when it is formed. Those holding to pre-existence, however, differed as to whether these souls were created specifically for human bodies with which they voluntarily united; or whether they were

originally designed for a more exalted sphere of activity and enjoyment, and were, as a punishment for their apostasy from God, forced into human bodies as into a prison. Plato and others seem to have held the latter opinion. Platonic philosophy had no inconsiderable influence upon the Christian church in various respects. Some of its brightest ornaments and ablest defenders believed with Plato that the soul was a part of the divine nature—a spark of the Deity. This belief, however, was not universal. Origin believed in pre-existence, but rejected the idea that the human soul is a part of the Deity. He held with the Platonists in saying that souls sinned before they were united with a body, in which they were imprisoned as a punishment for their sins.

Some of the Jews, it seems, in the time of Christ were affected with this doctrine of the metempsychosis—transmigration of souls. This is doubted by many able writers, but John ix. 1, 2., and Matt. xvi. 14. seem to admit of no intelligible explanation on any other hypothesis.

The pre-existence of human souls was clearly taught by Justin Martyr (*Diat. cum Tryphone Ind.*). This has been the common opinion of Christian mystics of ancient and modern times. They usually adhere to the Platonic theory, and regard the soul as a part of the divine nature, from which it proceeds and to which it will again return. The doctrine is now generally abandoned by Christian writers. (See McClintock & Strong, *Soul, Origin of.*) (*His Ch. Doctrine, Shedd.*)

SEC. II.—*Creationism*.—"The advocates of this theory called *Creationists* believed that the soul is immediately created by God whenever the body is begotten . . . Cyril of Alexandria and Theodoret among the Fathers in the Greek church, were of this opinion, and Ambrose, Hilary and Jerome in the Latin church. The schoolmen almost universally professed this doctrine, and generally the followers of Pelagius, with whom the schoolmen, for the most part, agreed in their views in regard to the native character of man ; for these views derived a very plausible vindication from the hypothesis that the soul was immediately created by God when it was connected with the body. The argument was this: If God created the souls of men, he must have made them either pure and holy, or impure and sinful. The latter supposition is inconsistent with the holiness of God, and consequently the doctrine of the native depravity of the heart must be rejected. To affirm that God made the heart depraved would be to avow the blasphemous doctrine that God is the author of sin. The theory of the *Creationists* was at first favored by Augustine, but he rejected it as soon as he saw how it was employed by the Pelagians. It has continued, however, to the present, the doctrine of the theologians of the Romish church, who in this follow after the schoolmen, and like them making little of native depravity, and much of the freedom of man in spiritual things. Among the Protestant teachers Melancthon was inclined to the hypothesis of the *Creationists*, although, after

the time of Luther another hypothesis was received with much approbation by Protestants. Still many distinguished Lutheran teachers of the seventeenth century followed Melancthon in his views concerning this doctrine, i.e., G. Calixtus. In the Reformed church, the hypothesis, which we are now considering, has far more advocates than any other, though even they have not agreed in the manner of exhibiting it. Dr. Shedd (His. chr. Doct. Vol. II, pages 11, 12) says: "Creationism . . . is a mixed theory. As respects the human soul it teaches that there are as many repeated and successive feats of creation as there are individuals in the series of human beings; while so far as the human body is concerned, there is but a single creative fiat. In the instance of each and every individual soul after Adam there is creation but no procreation or propagation. In the instance of each and every individual body after Adam, there is procreation or propagation but not creation. The physical part of every man considered as a creation *de nihilo*, dates back of birth and individual existence to the creation act mentioned in Gen. 1. 27; but this spiritual part, as a creation *de nihilo*, dates back only to birth, or to the commencement of individual existence, in whatever generation or year of the world it happens to be. Reckoning from the strict and absolute creation of each, the body of a man of this generation, upon the theory of Creationism, would be six thousand years older than his soul; for there is this interval of time between the creative fiat that originated the former

and the creative fiat that originated the latter. The theory, therefore, is a composite one."

REMARKS. 1. Creationism refers both body and soul to God as cause, regarding the first as a direct creation and the second as a procreation. But it does not follow that my body, on this assumption, is six thousand years older than my soul. Such cannot be the case unless it is indeed true that in creating the body of Adam God actually created the bodies of all men, which I suppose none but realists would admit. Dr. Shedd conceives that God created all men in a mass and that procreation is no more than the division of this mass into individuals, hence that the child of to-day is as old as Adam.

2. This view confounds potentiality with actuality. If this is true, Adam is as old as God, or the same reasoning that proves the child to be as old as Adam, proves Adam and all created things to be eternal.

3. It assumes human nature to be divisible ; that it existed in its entirety in Adam, but not in Cain or any one individual of his descendants. (This will be more fully noticed subsequently.) Adam "begat a son in his own likeness after his image." If his entire human nature was not imparted to Seth, then it is not true that the son was in the image of his father. Human nature in its essential attributes admits of no division and the realistic conception of humanity cannot be true. Adam, as to his body, was created or formed of the dust of the ground ; but his creation was not identical with that

of the ground ; nor was the creation of Cain identical with that of Adam. The creation of organic beings is the origination or beginning of a species of beings of like characteristics. Procreation is the perpetuation of the original type, not by division, but by the actual origination of another being identical in kind with the progenitor, but a different and independent individuality. The creation of an organic being is the origination *de novo* independently of a prior like organism. Procreation is the origination *de novo* of an organism through a prior like organism. The difference relates simply to modes of creation and not to the fact of creation. The act creating Adam did not create Abraham or any of his posterity.

According to Dr. Shedd's views, he being both realist and traducianist, the child of to-day is as old both as to soul and body as is Adam. Only recently individualized, where has it existed in its unindividualized state? Has God a special depository for humanity in an unindividualized mass? Or, as abstract human nature cannot exist independently of the individualized man, shall we assume that the child of to-day has existed for ages as an integral part of Adam and all its ancestors until its own individualization, really taking part in all their acts, partaker of all their joys, sins and sorrows? Unreasonable as all this may be, it is the necessary outcome of realistic traducianism as we shall see.

Creationism, I think, is not true, and though it is a composite theory in that it refers the creation of the soul and body to different modes of origina-

tion—the soul to direct creation, and the body to indirect creation. Still it is not so abhorrent to reason as Dr. Shedd's argument represents it. In fact, it seems less unreasonable that the body should be six thousand years older than the soul (which the creationist does not admit), than that both soul and body should exist as an active and responsible participant in the doings of all its ancestors from Adam down to its own individualization.

SEC. III.—*Traducianism*.—The third general theory concerning the soul is called Traducianism. "According to this theory the souls of children as well as their bodies are propagated from their parents. These two suppositions may be made: Either the souls of children exist in their parents as *real* beings (*entia*) like the seed in plants, and so have been propagated from Adam through successive generations, which is the opinion of Leibnitz in his *Thodea* (I., 91), or they exist in their parents merely *potentially* and come from them *per propaganem* or *traducem*. . . . This hypothesis formerly prevailed in the ancient Western Church. . . . This is the hypothesis to which the opponents of the Pelagians have been most generally inclined. . . . Since the Reformation this theory has been more approved than any other, not only by philosophers and naturalists, but also by the Lutheran Church. Luther himself appeared much inclined toward it, though he did not declare himself distinctly in its favor; but in the *Formula Concordiæ* it was distinctly taught that the soul as well as the body was prop-

agated by parents in ordinary generation." (McClintock & Strong. Soul, Origin of.)

"The theory of traducianism maintains that both the soul and body of the individual man are propagated. It refers the creative act mentioned in Genesis i. 27, to the human nature or race, and not to a single individual merely. (It considers the work of creating mankind *de nihilo* as entirely completed upon the sixth day; and since that sixth day the Creator has, in this world, exerted no strictly creative energy.) He rested upon the seventh day, and still rests. By this single act all mankind were created, as to both their spiritual and sensual substance in and with the first human pair, and from them have been individually procreated and born, each in his day and generation. Creation relates to the origination *de nihilo* of the total substance or nature of mankind, considered as a new and hitherto non-existent species of being. Birth is subsequent to creation and refers only to the modifications which this substance undergoes—its individualizations in the series of generations." (Hist. Chris. Doctrine. Vol. II., p. 13.)

(1) None except realists can accept this view of traducianism. Strictly it is not traducianism or procreationism; but is rather the metamorphosis of an existent being from one form into another, as the change of a tadpole into a frog. There is neither procreation nor traduction in the changing of a tadpole into a frog, or of an egg into a bird. But the egg has absolutely no existence prior to its origination in the mother. Otherwise potentiali-

ties and actualities are the same, and all possibilities are actualities.

According to Dr. Shedd all men soul and body, were created with Adam, and have actual being thousands of years before they have individual being, and what he calls their procreation is not procreation or generation or traduction, but purely metamorphosis from one actual state into another.

(2) Another objection to the theory in hand is incongruity in the use of the terms.

According to it, Adam was created only, not procreated. But Cain and all others are both created and procreated. But creation and procreation are mutually exclusive. Both originate being, and one as truly as the other, but not by the same method. Creation is direct without media. Procreation is indirect through media, or through progenitors. God is as truly the originator in the one case as the other. Procreation produces the ancestral type, but as really produces a new being as does creation. God in creating Adam did not create Cain, but only imparted to him the power of human parenthood, which is only the power of reproducing as an instrument of creative energy his own likeness in a new being.

According to the realistic view the deity exerts no creative energy in the innumerable forms of animal and vegetable life with which the earth in successive generations is caused to abound. This doctrine is, I think, contradicted by every science that throws any light on the subject; also by the Bible, notably by Job xxxi. 15, Isaiah xlv. 2, 24;

xlix. 5. Dr. Shedd in support of his theory refers to Gen. ii. 2, and says, "God rested on the seventh day and still rests." The text certainly means that God having created the progenitors of all the different orders of organic beings, rested (ceased) from that mode of creating. This surely does not mean that he is not continually exerting his power through ancestral organisms in the production of new creatures.

FACTS THAT PROVE OR SEEM TO PROVE TRADUCIANISM.

I. Physiological science strongly favors this view; and its facts are hard to reconcile with any other hypothesis.

"Adam begot a son in his own likeness after his image"—Gen. v. 3. If the soul and body were not both begotten, then it could hardly be true that the son was in his father's likeness, and after his image. Seth would have been the son of Adam only as to his body, but the son of God as to his soul, as was Adam.

It is true that some use this text to prove creationism, urging that if souls are propagated, then they cannot be in the likeness of that of Adam which was not propagated but created. This argument assumes that two things cannot be alike unless they are both produced by the same process. As well might it be said that two pictures cannot resemble the same person unless they are made by the same artist or by the same process.

Again, the argument, if it proves anything, proves too much; for if Seth's soul could not be

like Adam's, unless he was directly created by God, because Adam's was so created, neither could Seth's body be like Adam's, which was directly so created. This shows the fallacy of the argument.

2. The doctrine of traducianism seems to be fully proved by the obvious fact that children resemble their parentage not less in their mental characteristics than in their physical.

(1) Peculiar bodily forms, sizes, complexions, gestures, tones of voice and general manners often characterize families for many generations.

(2) So of their intellects, brilliancy, acuteness, accuracy, obtuseness. An adaptation to some particular intellectual pursuit or study or vocation often adheres to the same family for generations.

(3) The same is true of the emotional nature, the passions, affections, appetites and propensities.

(4) Men, it is allowed, differ very much in the character of their will power—some have much, some have little, some stubborn and some fickle wills and these characteristics are evidently transmissible from parent to progeny. The fact that they are characteristics of particular families can be accounted for only on the ground of heredity.

(5) The rule also holds in relation to our æsthetical nature. Members of the same family generally have strikingly similar tastes in relation to the same objects.

(6) The moral and religious characteristics also seem if possible to be more rigidly under the law of heredity than any other human characteristic.

(7) That most terrible of mental afflictions, in-

sanity, leaves no reasonable doubt of the fact that souls of the progeny are derived from the parentage.

3. The fact that the sacred scriptures represent children as being born in a depraved state seems to confirm the hypothesis that the soul is not directly created by God, but is a derivation from the parentage just as really and in the same manner as the body. (See Isa. xlviii. 8; Ps. lviii. 3; li. 5; Eph. ii. 3.)

Certainly no one would admit that God would create a soul with a corrupt or depraved nature; nor can we admit that a pure spirit can be morally corrupted by contact with a sensuous body, for the body apart from the soul is incapable of moral corruption. On the contrary, the soul subjects the body to such corruption so far as it is capable of defilement.

This array of facts might be much enlarged and they admit of explanation on no hypothesis so satisfactorily as upon that of the propagation of soul as well as body.

It is sometimes objected to traducianism that it favors the doctrine of materialism, or that the soul like the body is material and must perish with the body.

The objector seems to lose sight of the fact that the first man was created as truly a rational and immortal spirit as he was a mortal animal. This being true, the divinely ordained law that like produces like, would infallibly insure the rational and immortal spirit to the progeny, otherwise like would not produce like. But as the law confessedly holds good in the whole realm of organic life, lower in

the scale of being than man, we certainly have no right to make the human race an exception without the most explicit authority. This is confessedly wanting. The objection is therefore of no force.

If traducianism is true, then procreation or propagation is simply creation *de nihilo* continued through the instrumentalities of previously created progenitors; or God is continually creating new organisms in the likeness of pre-existing types. This view of creation favors the hypothesis that providence is simply the act of creation, indefinitely continued. Hence God's creative energy is as truly exerted in procreation as in creation, in the creation of the infant of to-day as in the creation of Adam. Many scripture texts seem strongly to favor the idea. (Gen. xxx. 2, Job xxxi. 15, Ps. cxxix. 13, Isa. xlv. 2, 24, Isa. xlix. 5.)

Traducianism gives us a comparatively easy solution of the much debated problem of universal depravity. We have only to accept the Bible fact that our natural head did by voluntary transgression corrupt his own heart or moral nature which was by the law of heredity transmitted to his posterity in accord with the invariable law that like produces like.

If it should be objected that this view seems to make the progenitor not the medium but rather the originator of the progeny, it seems sufficient to reply that specific character of the progeny is always determined by that of the medium or organism, and not by the creative power. (We have a pretty fair illustration in the ingrafting of one kind of fruit

upon another. The root or stock supplies the originating and life-giving power, but the engrafted scion determines the quality of the fruit. So in traducianism the creative energy of God is the originating and life-giving power; the progenitor or traducing medium determines the character of the progeny.)

CHAPTER II.

IMPUTATION.

BEFORE considering the subject of sin proper, let us first briefly bring under review certain schemes of imputation.

1. The Augustinian scheme as revised and improved by Anselm.

AUGUSTINE'S THEORY OF IMPUTATION.

I will first notice his explanation of how all men sin in Adam. He assumes distinct origin for "human nature" or humanity, and for the individual man Adam.

He does not tell us, so far as I know, whether these distinct origins are strictly synchronal or not synchronal; of course they are not synchronal as to Adam's posterity. But in the order of nature, humanity is prior to the individual, because the individual man is only the individualization of humanity. This humanity was created intelligent, free, and holy, and of course man, its individualization, was likewise created intelligent, free and holy.

As the whole of humanity existed in the one man Adam, the first sin was as truly the sin of humanity as it was of the individual man. Hence by the one sin of the individual, both the individual and the whole of human nature became equal participants

in the same sin. But every human being is just as truly an individualization of this common human nature as was Adam, and consequently did voluntarily participate in the first sin, being only an individualization of the common human nature which voluntarily sinned in Adam.

According to this theory the first individual corrupted the whole of human nature, and then this corrupted human nature corrupts all other individuals. Such is the theory of the origin and universality of human depravity.

We may respect this logic as being ingenious, but cannot, without closing our eyes, accept it as true.

Its whole force rests on the realistic element, with which it is interwoven. Anselm shows himself a realist. In the language of Bauer, he maintains "the actual existence of a universal (humanity) that is distinguished from the individual" (Adam).

He assumes human nature to be a real objective entity, prior in the order of nature to the existence of the individual man ; that men are only individualizations of this prior humanity.

He thus educes the concrete from the abstract, or real existence out of the ideal. But humanity or human nature is in reality only an abstract term, representative of the aggregated characteristics of the individual—a mere term of classification. The things represented by such abstracts are not real entities, but only conceptions of the mind. Abstracts have no existence independent of the concrete entities which they generically describe.

There can therefore be no physical nature independent of physical entities ; no divine nature independent of a divine Being. It was not human nature that was created, for it has no existence except in the mind, but man was created. It was not human nature that was created upright, but man. It was not human nature that was corrupted, but man ; and when we speak of corrupt human nature, we simply mean that men, humankind, are corrupt and not that something is corrupt which has been metamorphosed into men.

When the realism of Anselm's argument is eliminated it falls to pieces.

By the same kind of logic Anselm attempts to show not only how all men become corrupt, but actually guilty ; also how infants voluntarily sinned in Adam. This he does to his own satisfaction under the auspices of his realism. He invests abstract humanity with all the attributes of a real moral agent. He says these facts must be taken into account :

"First, there is a common human nature; secondly, there is a particular individual; thirdly, the individual is a production from the humanity. But this third fact, that all men are produced out of human nature, explains how all are sinners at birth. The individual Adam corrupted human nature and human nature corrupted every individual. But human nature voluntarily sinned, and as the infant is a production from this human nature, therefore the infant voluntarily sinned in Eden."

This is another phase of the Augustinian expla-

nation and involves the absurdity of predicating of the germ or potentiality what is true of that in which it exists, as noticed before and need not be rediscussed.

Perhaps the most remarkable part of Anselm's discussion of original sin is that in which he attempts to prove that Adam's first sin, but none of his other sins, and none of the sins of his other progenitors, is imputed to his posterity.

The vital point in the argument is the fact that the whole of the human nature was included in Adam and Eve when this first sin was committed. He says substantially, as stated by Prof. Shedd, "The first act of transgression was unique. There was never a second like it. The sins of Cain or Abel or any other individual were not the transgressions of an individual who included within himself the entire humanity. Even the individual transgressions subsequent to the first act of apostasy were only manifestations in his particular person of the generic (first) sin and sustained the same relation to it that the transgression of any other individual does. There is therefore no imputation of the subsequent individual sin of Adam to his posterity. That is only imputed to all men which all men have committed; and the only sin which all men have committed is that one sin which they all committed when they all, '*ille unus homo*,' were that human nature in the first human pair."

This doctrine, the imputation of Adam's first sin and not of his other sins, nor the sins of other progenitors to his posterity, is of vital importance to

the whole Augustinian and Calvinistic scheme. For if this is not true then the whole theory of the so-called Adamic covenant—federal headship, unique relationship, etc.—falls to the ground as a worthless speculation, and it would consequently follow that there was only natural headship in Adam, and that he sustained to his posterity only such relations as do other parents.

Anselm stakes this whole theory upon the argument in the quotation given above.

1. My first adverse statement is that the whole of this celebrated argument, like those previously noticed, is vitiated by its realism, and might therefore be dismissed as unworthy of further comment, but as great value is attached to it by some, I will give it further consideration.

He, Adam, was derived from a common humanity. He did possess certain characteristics on account of which he was reckoned a human being. He did actually possess a nature properly called human. But this nature he propagated whole and entire, whatever may be its essential characteristics. We often speak of man's animal, intellectual and moral natures. Perhaps we might regard these several characteristics as the essential characteristics of human nature. These, as we have seen, do not exist as something objective, but only as qualities in concrete forms—are not entities from which Adam was formed, but essential attributes of the man. Now it will be allowed by all whose eyes have not been put out by their logic, that Adam propagated these qualities in their entirety, and

human nature, which is but the sum of these qualities, to all his posterity. Hence it follows that human nature exists to-day in every man in its completeness as it did in Adam. If this is true the entire humanity, or human nature, as truly existed in Cain or Abel as it did in Adam. Hence it follows, despite the freaks of Anselm's logic, that if Adam's first sin was imputed, because entire human nature, rightly understood, existed in him at the time of its commission, then Cain's sin was equally imputable for the same reason, and so the sins of all other parents.

In the argument I have used the term humanity as the generic characteristic of men, while Anselm uses it as an objective entity from which man was derived. If I have correctly used the term my argument shows the utter fallacy of his reasonings.

2. But granting for argument's sake Anselm's conception of human nature, there seems to be some flaw in his reasoning. If Adam's first sin was imputable only while all humanity was resident in him, would not all his sins committed previous to the derivation or distribution of that humanity be for the same reason imputable? If like causes under the same conditions may be depended upon for like results, this would certainly be true. Hence, if the first sin vitiated the supposed mass of human nature while it was all resident in one man, then without a miraculous interference two or a dozen would vitiate it still more, and hence all Adam's sins before Cain's individualization are imputed.

3. I am tempted to exclaim, What a calamity

to the world that Adam did not distribute this objective human nature to the world before he corrupted it, then the world would never have known sin! Adam and Eve could not have sinned, and no one, no one pair of their descendants could have sinned because entire human nature would not have been resident in one or one pair.

4. The assumption in Anselm's argument is that this human nature is not propagable in its entirety, but only in parts. "The sins of Cain were not the transgressions of an individual who included within himself the entire humanity, therefore his sins were not imputable." But according to the logic, what was imputed to Cain was subtracted from Adam; so with Abel; so with Seth. We do not know how many children Adam had. A loose tradition says fifty-six. If so, after the fifty-sixth derivication of humanity how much did our first father have left?

The whole affair is as ridiculous as it is unreasonable, and merits the lash of the satirist rather than the respectful attention of the theologian.

5. In the quotation above given it is said: "Even the individual transgression of Adam subsequent to the first act of apostasy was only a manifestation in his particular person of the generic sin."

If this proposition is cautiously stated, as I suppose it to be, it seems to teach that there is no sin but this generic sin. The manifestation of a thing and the thing itself are different things. If we are allowed to make this just discrimination between a

thing and its manifestation in this case, then it follows that all Adam's subsequent sins so-called, as all the so-called sins of all men, are only manifestations of the "generic sin." Anselm does not elsewhere so teach, still the exigencies of the case required him to maintain this position in order to prove that none but Adam's first sin could be imputed. For if he had admitted that Adam's subsequent sin sprang from the action of his free will, then no reason could be assigned while human nature continued entire in him, why his subsequent sins should not be imputable.

All attempts to illustrate the relation of Adam and his posterity by human institutions are inadequate.

ZWINGLI'S THEORY OF IMPUTATION.

Zwingli thus seeks to illustrate imputation. He says, "All men who are born from Adam can be regarded as one man, just as all who are members of one civil community may be regarded as one body, and the whole community as one man."

OBJECTIONS.

1. A civil community may truly be regarded as one man, and one man be made to suffer unjustly for a whole community, and a whole community to suffer on account of one man. But this is because of the imperfections of human institutions, and of ignorance or dishonesty or weakness of their administrators. But still it is true that the acts of a community are not the acts of an individual, nor are the acts of an individual the acts of a commu-

nity. Our acts are not Adam's acts, nor his acts our acts, though we may suffer on account of them.

Zwingli illustrates this relationship by the relation of a bondwoman to her children. She being in a state of slavery her children are born slaves. The illustration is inapt. Such slavery is civil bondage and such children are slaves, not by natural or divine, but only by human or civil law. Her acts are not her children's acts, her virtue not their virtue, her guilt not their guilt. She transmits to her children human nature and not her adventitious character.

No comparison drawn from human institutions or from anything artificial or supernatural can adequately illustrate the relation. Nature alone can furnish the true illustration, the unerring analogy. The requisite analogy or illustration is furnished only in the immutable and unerring laws of heredity established by the great Creator for the perpetuation and conservation of his works, especially of human kind.

2. Another objection to the orthodox theory of imputation is its artificial and extraordinary character or its unnaturalness. (The physical world is in many respects a sort of sensible adumbration, a great, yet veritable symbolization of the moral and the spiritual world. In fact the physical and the moral largely overlap each other, or are in many respects largely coincident, so that what is physical in one aspect of it is moral in another. Both may sometimes require the interposition of the supernatural, but never when the end intended can be

accomplished by the natural. The law of parsimony is strictly the law of means in the Divine administration. If sufficiency of means for the accomplishment of the end is at hand a redundancy is never employed. This is as true of the moral as of the physical world. God is able to create as many plants and animals or men as he may wish, and whenever he may wish. This he could do instantly by fiat or by evolution as he might choose. But he chooses to make one or a pair of each species of flora or fauna or men, and make each self-perpetuative or procreative. His immutable decree is, "Like produces like." This law rules supreme over all the self-perpetuating organisms of the world, no less over the rational than over the irrational organizations. This is the law of heredity. That it does reign supreme and that it does accomplish its functions in the vegetable world, also in the irrational animal world, also in man's physical nature, also in his intellectual nature, is readily admitted by all that accept the doctrine of traducianism in its full extent. Why then should we at this point abjure the jurisdiction of the law of heredity, and refuse to accept the idea that the human progenitor does actually transmit to his progeny his moral nature as literally and fully as he does his physical, his intellectual, his emotional, his volitional nature? On this hypothesis there is an exact and full analogy in the operation of the law of heredity in relation to both the physical and moral aspect of humankind. On this plan man's moral nature is just as readily accounted for as his

physical or intellectual nature. The only difficulties in the case are in determining what that moral nature is, and how his ancestry came in possession of it.

The Almighty did not create this law, then create man and other things and then put them under it, nor did he create man and other things and then create this law to determine the relation between the parent and the progeny. But the law and its subjects are pure conceptions. Exactly the same is true of the moral law. The law and the subjects are conceptions. If this is true there is no need for the realistic or for the Federal Headship theory of imputation. The Natural Headship theory gives a more rational account of the doctrine of human depravity, and is withal better sustained by the sacred Scriptures.)

CHAPTER III.

SIN.

MAN CONSIDERED AS A SINNER.

MAN as a sinner is pre-eminently the branch of Anthropology with which theologians are accustomed to deal.

The supreme end of the gospel is to save men from their sins. The supreme end of preaching the gospel is to persuade men to forsake their sins and to come to Christ.

The lawyer, in order to help his client, needs not only to know the law, but also to know the exact nature of the client's case. The physician in order to relieve his patient needs to understand both the disease and the remedy.

It is likewise a matter of the first importance that the preacher in order to have efficiency in his calling should know at least something of the nature of sin—know what it is, and what it is not. What are its essential characteristics, and what are not such characteristics. Also to know what is its remedy and how that remedy becomes available. A knowledge of these things, more or less thorough, is also a prime necessity to all laymen who would be effective co-laborers with the ministry in the work of persuading and enabling sinners to forsake sin and come to Christ.

Even the sinner himself that desires to be saved, needs first of all to know something of the nature of his sins, and of the remedy, of the conditions through which it becomes available to his salvation. Your closest attention is therefore invited to these two great and vital questions. Sin and its only, but all-sufficient, remedy. The logical order is sin and its remedy. The whole need not a physician, but they that are sick.

SEC. I.—*The terms used to give us the idea of sin.*
—The doctrines of the Bible are comprised in its terminology. The doctrine of sin including its essence and characteristics is of course comprised in the words used by the oracles of revelation to define, explain, and characterize sin. A brief reference to these terms cannot fail to give us some proper idea of what sin is, and as to how it effects the human mind and conduct; also, how it affects our relations to God and to our fellow men.

HEBREW OR OLD TESTAMENT TERMS.

1. Several different words are used in the Hebrew scriptures to express the doctrine of sin. The more prominent of these are as follows:

(1) *Asham*, defined by "guilt" and "guilt offering."

(2) *Ashmah*, defined by "guilt" and "guilt offering."

(3) *Chet*, defined by "sin," "error," "failure."

(4) *Chataah*, defined by "sin."

(5) *Chattaah*, defined by "sin."

(6) *Chattath*, defined by "sin" and "sin offering."

This is the prevailing word for sin in the Old Testament.

(7) *Chattai*, defined "sin."

(8) *Avon*, defined by "iniquity."

(9) *Pesha*, defined by "trespass" and "transgression."

All these Hebrew words are, in our English Bible, translated by our word sin. Several of them are also translated guilt or sin offering or offering for sin; as *Asham*, Isa. liii. 10: "Thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin;" *Chataah*, Ps. xl. 6: "Burnt offering and sin offering hast thou not required." *Chattah*, Ezra vi. 17: "For a sin offering for all Israel." *Chattah*, Ez. xxx. 10: "With the blood of the sin offering of atonement."

2. The principal Hebrew verbs for "to sin" are as follows:

(1) *Chata*, defined "to sin" or "miss the mark."

(2) *Asah*, defined "to do," "to make" and translated "sinneth," in Num. xv. 29.

(3) *Shagag* is defined "to err, to go astray," translated "sin," in Num. xv. 28.

(4) *Shagah* is defined in the same way, and is translated "sin" in Lev. iv. 13.

3. The corresponding nouns for sin in the New Testament are the following:

(1) *Hamartēma*, defined "sin," "transgression."

(2) *Hamartia*, defined "sin," "sin offering."

(3) *Paraptōma*, defined "fall, offense, trespass."

The first of these words is used but few times and

is invariably translated "sin." The second is the current New Testament word for sin, and is generally so translated. In 2 Cor. xi. 7 it is rendered offense, and in Heb. x. 6 it is rendered sacrifices for sin.

The third is variously rendered, trespass, offense, fault, fall, and is three times rendered sin. Eph. i. 7, ii. 5, Col. ii. 13.

(The word *Parabasis*, and its corresponding verb *Parabaino*, have a kindred signification, and are generally translated transgression and to transgress, but never sin and to sin.)

4. The verb usually used in the New Testament to express the doctrine in hand is *hamartano*. This is variously defined, to miss a mark; to lose, be disappointed; to go astray; deviate, swerve; to mistake, err; to pass by, neglect, omit; to sin, transgress, offend. In the New Testament this word is generally rendered, to sin. It is in a few instances rendered to trespass, and to offend.

These words *hamatia* and *hamartano* are generally used in the Septuagint in translating the Hebrew words of the Old Testament.*

From those terms studied in the various connections in which they are used in the Holy Scriptures we are to learn what sin is, its nature and characteristics.

1. The forms to lose, to be disappointed, to go astray, to swerve, to deviate, to mistake, to err, to

* Note.—For an elaborate and scholarly discussion of these Greek words the reader is referred to Dr. R. Beard's *Theology*. Vol. II. Sec. 4 and 5

neglect, to pass by, to omit, to transgress, to offend, to sin, are general expressions which of themselves do not tell us exactly what we want to know. They give us in general terms the predicates or characteristics of the thing, rather than the thing itself. Something more specific is needed to enable us to see exactly what sin is. This desideratum is given in the definition to miss the mark; as an archer shooting at a mark misses it. This gives the exact thing in a concrete form, easy of apprehension, and of which we can make predications. Hence we can properly say to miss the mark is to lose our end, to miss the mark is to be disappointed in our expectations; to miss the mark is to stray, swerve, deviate from the goal aimed at; to miss the mark is to mistake the false for the true; to miss the mark is to omit or neglect what duty and interest require; to miss the mark is to transgress and offend against God and humanity; to miss the mark is to do any and all these things, each of which is sin in some sense.

2. The archer in shooting has a mark at which he aims, an end which he purposes to accomplish. So every rational being has an end at which he aims, an end which he purposes to reach. That end is good at least to himself, if to no others. This is the motive of all action; it underlies all rational activity. But every sin is a missing of this mark, a failure to accomplish the good intended, and a failure to realize the ultimate end of action and of life. Hence to sin is to bring injury or evil upon ourselves, and also upon others.

No man liveth to himself. Sinning is an offense to the Father of our spirits because it is a misuse of our abilities, and an abuse of the freedom that he has bestowed upon us for his honor and our good. As sin in relation to God is insubordination, in relation to ourselves it is the means of self-ruin. All this seems to be involved in the original and proper notion of sin.

3. The Bible says (1 John iii. iv.): "Sin is the transgression of the law." A more literal and a better translation is, Sin is lawlessness. *Hamartia est in anomia*. Of course every act of transgression is lawlessness, but every lawless act is not literally a transgression. To do what the law forbids is literal transgression. Not to do what it commands is not transgression, a going over or beyond, but a falling short of, what the law requires. The first is a sin of commission; the last is a sin of omission. But omission and commission are equally acts of lawlessness. Some critics doubt whether John's word, "Sin is lawlessness," is properly a definition of sin. Others affirm that it is a definition. The truth seems to be that it is not a literal definition of sin (*hamartia*), but is rather an abstract characterization of all sin. Lawlessness is properly predicable of every sin. No act of disobedience to civil law is defined as lawlessness, but every such disobedience is an act of lawlessness, or (changing abstract into the concrete) is a lawless act.

The Westminster and subsequent Presbyterian catechisms generally describe sin as any want of conformity unto, or transgression of the law of

God. This is sufficiently exact for practical purposes, though it is not quite logical.

(1) The statement is ambiguous. The first and the last part may be taken as antithetical. The meaning then would be, sin is either any want of conformity unto or a transgression of the law of God ; dividing all sins into two classes ; one consisting in a want of conformity unto law and the other in transgression of the law. This is illogical because transgression is as really a want of conformity unto law as any other sin can be. Those holding this view first distinguish between "transgression" and "want of conformity," while by the terminology the former is actually included in the latter. The logical distinction is given by the terms omission and commission.

(2) The last part of the statement may be taken as the equivalent of the first part, and as explanatory of it. This obliterates the difference between transgression and other sins, and is of course illogical, making, as it plainly does, a part (transgression) equal to the whole sin, (want of conformity unto) which, as previously stated, includes all sin, or making a species equal to the genus of which it is species. Sin is lawlessness, or any want of conformity unto the law of God. Both omission and commission are included in a want of conformity. Lawlessness is the genus and omission and commission are the species. This is logical and clear. Certainly John, when he said, "Sin is lawlessness," or "discrepancy from law," or "want of conformity unto law," did not mean to exclude sins

of transgression or sins of any kind. He rather meant to assert what is necessarily true of every sin, viz.: that it is a lawless act or state.

SECTION II.—*Sin considered as lawlessness.*—From this point of view let us consider sin and its logically related truths. Lawlessness presupposes two things; first, a law, and secondly, an act or state violative of the law. Obviously there can be no lawlessness when there is no law, nor when there is no act or state violative of the law. Each of these points requires a brief notice.

1. What is the law? The answer is, It is an expression or revelation of the will of the law-maker in whatever manner that will may be revealed; whether as a verbal or written revelation, or as a law written upon the heart, and apprehensible by the intuitions of reason. The law in this last form is common to all men. (Rom. ii. 14, 15.)

2. This law is the law of God, not as Creator merely, but as the Father of men.

All created things are under law, under divine law, and all law in relation to material and irrational things may be attributed to God as Creator merely. Between such things and God the relationship of fatherhood and sonship does not exist.

We never say God is the Father of the earth or of any irrational thing. The reason for not doing this is that they do not bear the image and likeness of God. Men, on the contrary, are made in the image and likeness of God, and for this reason they are the children of God. Like produces like, not

in creation but in genus and progeny only. Adam begat a son in his own likeness. Cain created or built a city but not in his own likeness. These facts illustrate the difference between generation proper and mere creation. It is the distinctive characteristic of generation that the likeness of the parent is transmitted to the progeny. But in mere creation there is no transmission of such likeness. To be made in the image and likeness of God constitutes sonship, and this implies fatherhood. Hence Adam was truly the "son of God." This he was because God gave to him his own likeness, thereby making him his son, and differentiating him from all other things pertaining to the earth.

It is true men have a physical organism, common with other animals, and as such may be regarded as the product of a mere creative act. But this act does not distinguish from other animals, nor make them the children of God. God is the creator of our bodies, but the "Father of our spirits." This distinction between creatorship and Fatherhood—between creation and sonship—is of immense importance in the sphere of morals and religion, as we may see in due time. It may be urged as an objection to this view that the scriptures sometimes confound creation and generation, or represent the same act both as a creation and a generation, that Christ himself is called the beginning of the creation of God—(Rev. iii. 14 ; Prov. viii. 25,) and yet he is called the only begotten son of God ; that God created man in his own image, and yet Adam was called the "son of God ;" that those who be-

lieve savingly are created anew in Christ Jesus, yet that those who believe are born of God and are the sons of God.

These facts teach us that when God is the creator and generator, both creation and generation are predicated of what seems to us the same divine act. This is true, however, only of God, not of creatures; with them creation and generation are broadly distinguishable. Creation and generation are often predicable of the same thing. What the plant or animal generates, God creates, and the two acts are not the same. Even when God is both creator and generator there is necessarily a difference between the products of the creative and the generative acts; otherwise all originated things would sustain to God the same relation—all things would be sons of God, or none would be so. It is a self-evident fact that the divine act which produces a child of God is a different act in kind from that which produces only an animal or a plant. This difference may be expressed by the general statement that all acts that transmit, produce, or reproduce the divine likeness, and secure sonship are generative acts, and hence are the acts of Fatherhood, and not of creatorship; conversely, that all divine acts that do not give the divine likeness to the things thereby produced, are acts of creatorship and not of Fatherhood. If this is true then creatorship and Fatherhood express essentially different relations; the same is true of creature and sonship, and the terms creation and generation are not strictly convertible terms, though both in a few instances are applied

to what to us seems to be the same thing. We know that generation, both in the sphere of the divine and the human always gives to the progeny the likeness of the progenitors. This gives the relation of father and son. We know equally well that creation does not give this likeness, and consequently does not establish the relation of father and son.

It may, however, be true that all divine generation is accompanied with some form of creation, though all creation is not accompanied with generation. If this is so, then we can perceive how both creation and generation can be affirmed of Christ, Adam and those that savingly believe in Christ.

Be this as it may, it is apparent enough that all that bear the image of God are the children of God, and became so by generation rather than by creation.

These distinctions may at first seem to be of small value, either theoretically or practically. Yet without them we are exceedingly liable to form inadequate or even egregiously false conceptions of many grave questions of both theoretical and practical value; such as divine sovereignty, the divine law, the nature of sin, and other related subjects. Some of these will now be considered.

SEC. III.—*The Ground of Sovereignty.*—Certainly God is sovereign—supreme and absolutely sovereign. To deny this is to deny the divine personality and reduce the deity to a blind and purposeless omnipotence.

But what is the ground of this sovereignty, or what gives to God the right of sovereignty? I answer negatively:

1. It is not his uncreatedness nor the unconditionedness of his being, nor his omnipotence, nor his wisdom, nor his justice, nor his benevolence, nor any one or all of his attributes combined. The discriminating mind, upon a little reflection, cannot fail to see that no one, nor all these attributes combined, can confer sovereign rights. This is so plain that it needs only to be stated to be understood.

2. Sovereignty does not have its ground in creatorship; or the fact that God is the creator of all things does not give him sovereign prerogatives.

I am not unaware of the fact that this statement is in palpable conflict with the commonly accepted opinion. How common, or rather how well-nigh universal, is it to say, God is universal creator and therefore universal sovereign. Truly God is universal creator and equally is it that he is universal sovereign. But he is not sovereign because he is creator.

To make creatorship the source of sovereignty strongly favors the miserable maxim that might gives or makes right. It also favors, if it does not require, the belief that God is in an offensive sense a despotic ruler and that the government of the moral world is a pure absolutism which determines human character and human destiny independently of human freedom. It thus strongly favors the pessimistic view of the world, and leaves thousands of reflecting minds in serious doubt as to whether the

supreme Ruler is in any sense the Father of our race. All this and much more to the same effect comes legitimately enough out of the false notion that sovereignty is a prerogative of creatorship or that God is properly sovereign because he is creator. Hence in some of our most popular schemes of theology the Divine Fatherhood is scarcely acknowledged at all. Legitimate sovereignty is distorted into a sort of selfish aristocracy which capriciously pretermits all equitable methods of administration and distributes favors it would seem only for self-aggrandizing purposes. Other more liberalized schemes of theology give greater prominence to the doctrine of universal Fatherhood, but make it subordinate to creatorship and account God justly sovereign because he is the creator. (Certainly creatorship has its rights, but sovereignty in any proper sense is not one of them.)

Let us consider a few facts.

(1) Creatorship, of course, gives a property right in what is created, but these property rights are not identical with the rights of sovereignty, nor are they analogous to them. The mechanic that makes or creates a house has a valid property right in that house. It is his because he created it (did not originate *de novo*, the materials but constructed them into a house). He is at liberty to dispose of it at will, to change it, sell it, give it away, or destroy it. The man also has a right in his children, but this is a very different right from his right to his house, and a much superior one. The two rights are not only not identical, but are in no respect

properly analogous; and any attempt to illustrate one by the other necessarily leads to grievous error in that it degrades our divine Father to a property holder, and the man and his children into a mere species of chattel. The two rights, both valid, rest on grounds wholly independent and distinct.*

This difference is simply the difference between the rights arising respectively out of creatorship and Fatherhood. Mere creatorship does in no instance impart likeness to what is created. The house is not like the man that made it. But fatherhood does invariably impart or reproduce the father's likeness, and for this reason and this alone the progeny is a child and a lawful heir. This impartation of likeness, and this alone, gives to the parent the right to require of the child reverence, love and obedience. Creatorship, of itself, gives no such right. But this right to the reverence, love and obedience is simply the right of sovereignty—is in fact the very essence of sovereignty. On the contrary the rights inherent in creatorship are in no sense those of sovereignty, but are exclusively those of mere propriety or ownership.

No man would seriously say that the mechanic has sovereign rights in the house or over the house or to the house which he makes. But he might very pertinently be called the sovereign over his household or children. Hence sovereignty is a function of fatherhood alone, and in no proper sense

*NOTE.—The Father has a natural right to the reverence, love and obedience of the child, at least 'till he forfeits this right. But he has no right to sell it.

of creatorship. If it should be said in opposition to this view that the Bible does not discriminate between creatorship and fatherhood ; that God formed man of the dust of the ground ; that he created man in His own image ; that Adam was as truly a creature of God as he was the son of God ; that men are often spoken of as creatures as well as the children of God, and that God is represented both as our Creator and Father. This is all readily admitted in its full force, but it does not disprove the difference between creation and generation, or between the relation established by the two acts. It is too plain to require elaborate argument that the act which produced the animals and the act which produced Adam in the image of God and made him the son of God were specifically different acts. The specific difference is clearly shown by the difference in their respective products, the one producing mere animals and the other transmitting the divine likeness and constituting a being called "the Son of God." All that have the image of God are creatures, but all creatures do not bear the image of God ; all the children of God are creatures, but all creatures are not the children of God. This gives the relation of genus and species. The generic name includes the specific and is often used for it, just as we often call the white oak by its generic name oak. This sufficiently explains why the children of God are often spoken of as the creatures of God.

The earth and the ox are creatures but not children because they were not created or formed in

the image of God. Adam was a creature and also a son because he was created in the image of God. Sonship implies fatherhood, and fatherhood gives sovereignty. God is not the sovereign of the ox but the owner. "The cattle upon a thousand hills are mine," but he is the sovereign of all beings that bear his image because He is the Father of all such.

God, as Creator, displays his being and his eternal power and Godhead in the physical world. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth His handiwork." Over the physical world God rules, not as sovereign but as a pure, necessitating or causal power. All freedom and moral suasion are excluded.

But God as Father rules over those that bear his likeness, over his children, not by necessitating or causal force, but by moral suasion or by motives addressed to beings intelligent and free. Hence it is not creatorship as such, but fatherhood alone that gives the possibility of sovereignty of a moral world and moral government.

(2) *Law*.—As we have seen, fatherhood alone gives sovereignty. In like manner fatherhood and sovereignty alone give moral law, or for brevity we may say sovereignty, which necessarily implies fatherhood, gives law or is the law-making power. This, I suppose, will be universally conceded.

Creatorship may and does give physical law, but not moral. If it did, then of necessity everything created would be subjected to moral law which no one would admit to be true. Physical law implies no reason, no rational intelligence, no freedom in

its subjects. It consequently excludes the possibility of moral distinctions, or of moral retribution, or rewards and punishment. We never charge physical things with moral wrong, or think of inflicting punishment, or of bestowing reward upon them.*

But the reverse of all this is true of moral law. It implies reason and freedom in its subjects, and supposes them to have a moral sense and a conscience, and to be capable of moral retribution. Only because men have the image of God, or are the children of God are they the subjects of such a law or capable of its award. It is connate with sonship, and co-extensive with the paternal relation, and comes necessarily out of the sovereignty involved in paternity, and can come from no other source. (It of course may be also objectively given as it is to us in revelation.)

What human authority except that of the parent, or someone acting in his place, has the right to control the child as to say what it shall eat or drink or wear or do, or to require its supreme reverence, love, or obedience? In its minority the will of the parents is the supreme law of human authority over it. This none can question. But why? Only because of the existing parental relation. Because it is their child, bearing their image, the parents have absolute human sovereignty over it, and the

*The little boy may personify his toy horse and deal with it as if it were capable of reason and feeling, reward and punishment. But this is all imaginary, not real. A man may teach his horse or dog, but he does this by physical suasion, or other means than moral suasion, or appeals to no moral sense.

only human sovereignty over it. (Of course the parent in the exercise of this supreme human authority is bound by the will of the Supreme Father of all.)

If the child is deprived by death or otherwise of its parents, its natural sovereigns and protectors, and some other person takes the place of the parents, such persons have lawful authority over the child only because they have taken the parents' place. In every conceivable case the sovereign authority rests upon parenthood.

This is just as true of civil or state sovereignty as it is of domestic or family sovereignty. Only so far as the State fills the place of fatherhood has it any sovereign right over its citizens; for all civil, all legal authority rests on ethical ground, and that ethical ground is found in fatherhood alone.

All human rights are birthrights, natural or God given rights. Civil governments do not give them, and cannot without usurpation take them away or abridge them. On the contrary civil governments are only the agencies established by the people, either formally or informally, to exercise the function of the common fatherhood, and to secure to every citizen the full enjoyment of his birthrights. Hence the ethical relation between the State and the citizen is strictly the relation of parent and child.*

But sovereignty gives law, or rather the sovereign

*The rights of State sovereignty, when reduced to their ultimate ground, have absolutely no foundation except in fatherhood. All civil authority exercised without respect to this fact is a sheer usurpation. Governments should not be per-

will is the law in whatever manner it may be expressed, and fatherhood being the sole ground of sovereignty is of course the source, and the only source, of ethical law, which is the only valid ground of civil law.

The divine fatherhood given, what should we, *a priori*, believe concerning the end and requirements of the divine law? I reply :

1. We should reasonably expect the supreme end of the law to be the good of those that bear the image of the Divine Father, and whom he recognizes as his children. So reasonable is this inference from the essential nature of fatherhood, that we should be greatly horrified to learn that the reverse is true; for this would set divine Fatherhood in the utmost antagonism to all human parentage and to the instincts of even the lower animals generally. We know that human parents have the greatest solicitude and make the greatest sacrifices for the welfare of their children. The supreme end of the law adopted for the government of their households is the good of their children. If this is not essentially true of the divine Fatherhood, then men are not like their heavenly Father, and do not bear his image; God actually deceives us when he proclaims himself our Father and calls us his children; or the Bible becomes a riddle and not a revelation.

It is known that the view of law here maintained is in conflict with very high human authorities.

mitted to exist for their own sakes or for the spoils and emoluments of office, for in so far as they do this they pervert the ends of their own existence. ✓

It seems to be a favorite opinion of many great and good men that the supreme end of the law is the good or glory of the lawgiver alone.

Of course God did not create the world without a motive or purpose, and his desires constitute the rule or law of his administration for the accomplishment of his purposes. This motive or purpose we are authoritatively told was "for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures." This purpose is explicitly stated thus: "By the decree of God for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated to everlasting life, and others fore-ordained to everlasting death:" or the motive of God in creation was the manifestation of "the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures." The motive of the election decree we are told was "the praise of his glorious grace," and the motive of his decree of reprobation was "the praise of his glorious justice."—Westminster Confession, p. 3.*

* It is impossible to conceive of a more heartless selfishness than is here attributed to the Father of our spirits, who is repeatedly declared to be "love." A greater incongruity or distortion of terms than is here displayed would be hard to find. To create immortal spirits and decree and procure their sin (ch. 5) would be an act of heartless cruelty. To deliver such from their helpless misery (not guilt) would not be an act of grace or mercy at all, but only a poor compensation for the prior act of flagrant injustice. Again, for God to create immortal spirits and decree and procure their sin, and then for the manifestation of the "glory of his sovereign power over his creatures" ordain them to dishonor and wrath, would be an act of injustice and cruelty that I should hesitate to attribute to Satan himself.

From this scheme of sovereignty divine Fatherhood is quite excluded. It makes sovereignty a function of creatorship exclusively. It also makes God's sovereignty over his creatures (children) identical in kind with man's "dominion" or rule over the lower animals (Gen. i. 27) except that man has the right only to use, not abuse, the animals under his dominion; while to God is attributed the sovereign right "for the glory of his dominion over his creatures" to reprobate his own children prior to their existence and sin, "to dishonor and wrath."

Happily for the future of Christianity this barbarian philosophy (not theology) which for centuries has greatly impeded the progress of Protestant Christianity, now finds advocacy only in a few able but fossilized pessimistic philosophers.

The great majority of those that have received the doctrine by inheritance from an honorable and pious ancestry, now either reject the doctrine as inherently false, or wisely deem it imprudent to preach it. It consequently is measurably expelled from the pulpit, and measurably suppressed from current religious literature.

This change of opinion and practice in regard to the doctrine requires a corresponding change as to the grounds of divine sovereignty, requires the recognition of Fatherhood and not mere creatorship, as the proper and only true ground.

Just in proportion to the recognition and appreciation of this glorious truth—the Fatherhood of God—will Christianity be freed from pessimistic hues with which it has been draped by a cold and

false philosophy. The Fatherhood of God fully recognized as the source of sovereignty and law will, without doubt, invest our holy religion with a radiance and a warmth which cannot fail to commend it with far greater force, both to the reason and affections of men.

How different the whole mental state of the child when standing in the presence of one recognized as a father or mother from that state experienced when standing in the presence of one recognized as a stranger, a master, a tyrant! How much more readily and cheerfully does the child obey commands when it comes to know that they are imposed by a loving father for its own good, and not merely for the cold selfish ends of one who gives the commands as "for the glory of his sovereign power over it."

It is well-nigh a self-evident truth that any theory of divine sovereignty other than that which rests on divine Fatherhood, while it may awaken a slavish fear, cannot inspire reverence, love, and filial obedience. This is in full accord with the Bible, reason, and human experience. Fatherhood given, we readily infer, and cannot fail to infer, that the paramount design of the law is the good of God's household.

2. This most rational conclusion is fully supported by *a posteriori* arguments. (We safely infer the design of a thing from its uniform tendency.) We know by actual experience and observation that the divine law is conservative of good. We know that obedience to law insures our safety; that disobedience to law brings only evil. This conserva-

tive power of law proves its design to be our good and not evil. Certainly there is no ground for doubt on this subject. If the animal perils its life in the interest of its young ; if the reason and instinct of the human parent, notwithstanding his imperfections, prompt him to adopt and enforce rules for the good of his children rather than to serve his own selfish ends, how abhorrent to reason is it to suppose that our divine Father, who is love and in whose image we are, should impose on us a law whose supreme end is not our good, but to "display the glory of sovereign power over (us) his creatures."

3. The nature of the requirements of the law is easily inferred from what has been said.

(1) It requires nothing except our good. We are so constituted that our well-being is conditioned upon our obedience to law ; and every man is the chief beneficiary of his own obedience. His good deeds affect the well-being of his fellows—his evil deeds may bring evil upon others ; but neither his good nor bad deeds essentially affect the well-being of his Maker. He would be as truly God, possessed of infinite self-sufficiency, without us and our imperfect services as with them. When we reverence God, love God, obey God, we do not profit him, but ourselves and our fellows. He requires nothing of us because he is in any way dependent upon us, or profited by us.

When we do right—love and obey him—he is pleased with us. When we do wrong—hate and disobey him—he is displeased with us.

Certainly every requisition which he makes of us is prompted solely by his Fatherly love, his desire for our good.

Infinitely self-sufficient in himself, what motive, other than the good of his children, could he have for requiring anything of them?

True, he sometimes speaks to us in the stern tones of authority. But when he does so he is no less our loving Father than when he speaks to us in the language of persuasion and soft entreaty. When the human father sternly, even angrily, commands his ignorant or thoughtless child to keep out of the fire, where danger lurks, he loves the child as truly as when he speaks approvingly or complacently. In fact the command, however stern, is itself proof of that love. So when our divine Father speaks in threatening words, it is but the stern voice of love saying, "Do thyself no harm."

It is also true that he visits aggravated and persistent rebellion against his Fatherly authority with justly deserved punishment—sometimes extraordinary punishment.

Although he is our Father, his sovereign power over us is not restricted as is the power of human parentage. As the Supreme Father, it is his sovereign right to create and destroy, to kill and to make alive, and, in his infinite wisdom, to do whatever he sees is best for his children, and none may, without blasphemy, challenge the justice or wisdom of his ways. We may be startled, appalled at the fearfulness and seeming severity of his visitations, because we do not understand them—they are too

high for our comprehension—but we are not warranted in impeaching his justice, his wisdom or his love on account of our inability to understand his purposes and the means he employs for their accomplishment.

The finite may apprehend but cannot comprehend the infinite. What to our very limited and distorted minds may seem unjust or severely cruel, may be in fact the highest display of Fatherly love and favor. The overthrow of the Antedelvians, the Sodomites, and the Canaanites and other physically and morally debauched peoples may have been, and probably was greater display of Fatherly love than the deliverance of the Hebrews from Egyptian cruelty. Anger and love, even among human-kind often coexist in the same bosom. God's acts of anger (so called) doubtless are only the expressions of a wisdom and love too high for our comprehension. We should rejoice in the conviction that his anger never obscures his wisdom or contravenes his Fatherly love for those that bear his image. If he chastens or afflicts or punishes, however severely, it is not through any hatred or animosity or to gratify any malevolent or revengeful feeling, but solely for the good of those for whose welfare he is always concerned; "but though he cause grief, yet will he have compassion according to the multitude of his mercies, for he doth not afflict willingly (or from the heart), nor grieve the children of men; to crush under his feet all the prisoners of the earth, to turn aside the right of a man before the face of the Most High." (Lam. iii. 32-35.)

Possibly more good comes to men out of what we call calamities than out of what we deem good; or what we deem the evil and deem the good are so interblended in the manifold providence of God, that we often, no doubt, mistake the one for the other.

It is therefore the truest philosophy and also the highest piety to submit cheerfully to his will, even under what seems a calamity, and even implicitly to cast our care upon Him who above all others careth for us, knowing that he will never leave us nor forsake us, having said that "all things work together for the good of them that love God."

We have every assurance of the fact in every condition in which we may be placed, whether in prosperity or adversity, in wealth or in poverty, in honor or dishonor, in health or affliction, in sainthood or in sinhood, God is still our Father, loving us, pitying us, rejoicing with the pure and good, and having no pleasure in the death of the wicked who despite his Fatherly warnings and entreaties, have brought ruin upon themselves.

In the light of such truths as here indicated, we are, if I mistake not, better prepared to apprehend the end of the divine law and the nature of its requirements. Surely we can truthfully say the end of the law is good, and all its requirements just such and only such as the infinite wisdom of the All-loving Father sees to be best for our present and endless happiness.

This view of the source, end and nature of the law enables us to see in its true light the real nature or characteristics of sin.

CHAPTER IV.

SIN (CONTINUED).

IN the light of the above truths let us consider sin in some of its aspects.

1. Sin is lawlessness, insubordination, rebellion, not against our Creator, as such, not against a heartless autocrat who has by accident or otherwise obtained unjust power over us, but against the will and rightful authority of our Supreme Father who stands in no need of our services, and requires absolutely nothing of us except for our own good and the good of others than himself.

This lawlessness is the climax of unreason.

(1) Because it is necessarily displeasing to our Father, who loves us as no others can love us, and whom it should be our supreme delight to reverence, love and obey; or whom we above all others should seek to please. What child commands so little sympathy or provokes more general and deeper aversion than such as persistently defy parental authority and despise parental favor? If sins against human parentage are justly deemed odious, how much more odious are sins against a heavenly Father, who has given us our earthly parents and all other blessings?

(2) Sin is the essence of unreason or folly, because it is as destructive of our own interest as it is displeasing or offensive to God. We often

think and even speak of sin as if it, at the utmost, could subject us only to some objective live or punishment, such as may be inflicted upon a mere brute, as an ox or dog. Because of this low and utterly false notion of sin, many hesitate not to commit it, hoping that, like the ox or dog, they may escape punishment; or that the gratification of the sinful desire will more than compensate them for the punishment. Thousands deceive and ruin themselves by these and similarly fallacious methods; not recognizing the fearful truth that every sin against their divine Father is equally a sin against themselves.

Our mental and moral well-being is as truly conditioned upon our obedience to law as is our physical good. In neither respect can we transgress with impunity. The transgression of hygienic law brings injury, disease or death. So it is of the transgressions of moral law. The retributions of the latter are not less sure and generally far more terrible than the former. In both cases the transgressor is a sinner against himself and suffers the bitter consequences of his lawlessness. Sin is consequently of all unreasonable things the most unreasonable.

2. Sin is arrogance. Our heavenly Father tells us for our own good what to do and what not to do. But we arrogate to know better than he what is for our good. The father says to the child: You must not play with the fire. You must keep out of the pond. You must not play with the razor, nor trifle with the gun, nor eat poisonous berries, etc. All these restrictions are made in love and for the

child's good. But the child thinks it knows better than the father what is for its good—thinks the father does not want it to be happy—and does not hesitate to violate these and all other parental commands; and injury, disease or death or calamity in some form is the result, and no amount of unavailing regret can undo the evil done.

In like manner our divine Father tells us for our good what we must do and what we must not do. But we, like the ignorant and self-willed child, arrogate to know better than our Father what is best for us. 'This is supreme arrogance.

3. Sin is ingratitude in its most aggravated form. Our father is pre-eminently the Father of mercies, from whom comes every good and perfect gift—from whom we receive being itself and all our capacities for good and all the means for securing good. We receive all these blessings much as the irrational animal receives its food, without even in the slightest manner acknowledging the kind hand that bestows them. If we receive these innumerable and inestimable favors at all, we often attribute them, not to their prime source, our munificent and provident Father, but to that blind impersonal thing called nature, or to chance or to ourselves, or to some other than the true source. These inestimable blessings we often use for purposes in utter conflict with the purposes for which our heavenly Father confers them. 'This not only convicts us of the deepest ingratitude to the Giver of all good, but actually converts his richest blessings into curses to ourselves.

4. Sin is a perversion or misdirection of our powers. Our mental powers are given us that we may know God and our relation to him, and also know the means by which we may secure to ourselves his complacent love and all the blessings temporal and spiritual that he has in store for us; and only so far as our intellects and all our mental acquisitions contribute to this end are they of any use to us. But instead of making our chief concern to know God and his character and will as revealed in ourselves and in external nature, in his providence and word, we are wont to shut him out of our thoughts. We do not like to retain him in our thoughts, but are much inclined, not only to exclude him from our hearts, but also to exclude him from all nature, and attribute his great and marvelous works to chance or fate or some nondescript power deified as the unknown and unknowable. This is one form of the perversion of our intellectual powers. Another and far more common mode of perversion consists in directing its activities to the device of means for the gratification of desires and the accomplishment of ends as dishonoring to God as they are deleterious to the true interests of men.

All our mental powers are given us only for the purpose of promoting our own good and that of others; and this can be done only by subordinating all our mental activities to the will of God as our supreme rule of life.

Our ignorance of physical or moral law is largely the result of misdirected mental energy and from our ignorance of God's laws in the physical and

moral world, or their willful disregard comes the far greater part of the misery, unhappiness, and discontent with which the world abounds. Men by their ignorant or willful violation of hygienic law bring about disease, pestilence, and plague, and hesitate not to charge their afflictions to the Ruler of the world.

In like manner, but in Christendom with a much greater degree of culpability, we by our ignorance or willful transgression of moral law produce moral abnormalities and moral pestilence which blight human hopes and drown souls in remediless perdition. Such calamities are the natural result of the violations of the beneficent laws upon conformity to which our heavenly Father has conditioned the physical and spiritual well-being of the world, and are not properly, as is often asserted, supernatural visitations of providence. This is evident from the fact that the pestilence stays its ravages when the proper sanitary conditions are restored, and the moral malady ceases to kill when the soul is restored to its normal state, its obedience to moral law.

It is the sum of absurdities to violate hygienic law and then expect to enjoy perfect health; equally so to violate moral law and yet expect to be morally healthy, contented or happy. A virulent ulcer on the body is a hungry canker-worm that drinks up the vital energy faster than nature can supply it; so sin is to the soul an ever-active voracious canker-worm which turns the sweets of self-complacent innocence into gall and creates a moral death.

5. Sin is ruinous prodigality. It misuses or abuses or perverts the bounties of heaven into evils. Our divine Father has bestowed upon his children (all are his offspring) a good inheritance, suited to all and sufficient for all. In an inventory of this common patrimony might be named sunlight, air, water, and the varied and inexhaustible treasures of the earth which are adequate to supply the wants and furnish food, raiment, shelter and comfort to hundreds of millions more than now exist. He also furnishes to every people brawn and brain sufficient to insure food and raiment and comfort to every human being. There is absolutely no necessity of nature why any should go hungry, or starve, or suffer any discomfort from the want of those things that the great Father has conditioned upon human activity. An inestimable part of this divine patrimony is the moral faculty, the power of cognizing right and wrong, our duty to him as our common Father and to our species as a common brotherhood.

True, sin has greatly enfeebled this moral faculty so as to render it an imperfect guide in morals and in religion. Still, it exists as a part of human heritage in every human breast, and is of high value in enabling every man to be a law unto himself and to be at peace with himself.

All the facts bearing on the subject show, in a satisfactory way, that our common Father has made bountiful provisions for all the physical and spiritual needs of his own household. But that household is far from realizing the happiness provided for

them and made attainable by them. The world abounds with human wretchedness and sore discontent. In many respects it seems less a paradise than a pandemonium. Human wretchedness in almost every conceivable degree and form largely abounds—wretchedness from poverty, wretchedness from physical disease, from moral pestilence, from causeless discontent, from fraternal strife, from family broils, from incurable animosities, from blighted hopes, from disappointed ambition, and from tormenting fears, from unavailing regrets, and from remorseful consciences.

Nearly the whole of this unhappiness is directly or indirectly the product of human wills and human hands, and of course might be avoided. Instead of crediting all this human wretchedness to divine Providence and impeaching the wisdom and love of the Father of our spirits, we should, without ignoring a universal providence, rather attribute it to human laziness, filthiness, improvidence, dissipation, sensuality, cupidity, lying, cheating, defrauding, envy, malice and ambition, and kindred causes, all of which are but other names for sin. Sin is the mighty fountain that floods the world with all its real woes. Of course it is not meant that every man's sins affect only himself, or that every man's afflictions and calamities, physical and moral, are the product of his own sins, for one man's sins may bring evils upon others besides himself.

The actual state of the world is that of an immense household, the greater part of which is in

open rebellion against supreme parental authority. All are desirous of the same thing and all striving for it, viz: happiness, but each one seeking it in his own way, each making his own will the supreme law of his own actions, and ignorantly or purposely violating the very laws upon obedience to which parental wisdom and love have conditioned their happiness. What right have we to expect happiness when we ignorantly or purposelessly fail to do the very things that our divine Father for our good has commanded us to do; or when we persistently refuse to do what he requires us to do for our own safety? Surely none. The self-willed child that despises parental authority and defiantly violates precepts intended for its good, comes naturally to grief and shame and is the author of its calamities, and yet thinks its fate a hard one. But the rebellious household not only fails to reverence, love and obey its beneficent and loving Father, but in reckless lawlessness tramples under foot the common rights of the brotherhood. Impelled by a supreme selfishness each seeks the accomplishment of his own ends largely, perhaps wholly, regardless of the rights and interests of others, and thus they bring upon one another innumerable evils, physical and moral. A large percentage of the hard earnings of mankind is required to support the civil government and the world. But the only reason for the existence of the government is to make men mind their own business and let other people alone. But the agents of these governments are more or less ignorant or selfish, either not

knowing how to accomplish the end of their appointment or are too selfish to do right. Hence the governments themselves can claim, even the best of them, to be nothing more than necessary evils. Their necessity arises out of the ignorance, the moral corruption, and selfishness of humanity. They are evil because they are as ignorant, morally corrupt and selfish as those they attempt to govern. Ignorance is set to enlighten ignorance; corruption to purify corruption, and selfishness to subdue selfishness.

Instead of an obedient and harmonious household, each loving the other as he loves himself, as the loving Father of all commands, and the highest good of all requires, we have a household which is a quasi pandemonium, where ignorance, discord, envy, jealousy, hatred and every possible form of selfishness reign. Human misery in every form is a natural result of all this lawlessness. Wherever lawlessness abounds misery must abound. The latter is in exact proportion to the former. The world can never be relieved from these evils, physical and moral, except by a return to obedience to the divine law.

Let men come to love God supremely and their neighbors as themselves, learn to love mercy and deal justly in all things, to do unto others as they would have others do unto them, then would moral evils be swept from our world, and our physical evils be mitigated a thousand-fold or even well-nigh banished. For though the physical and the moral are distinct, yet they are so in-

imately connected that a large per cent of our physical evils have their ultimate source in the infractions of moral law. These facts are verified to a limited extent in cases where no great deterioration is inherited, and where the individual lives mainly obedient to the requirements of both hygienic and moral law. A moral world without the liabilities of sin and consequent suffering is an impossible thing; impossible not because God is not omnipotent and wise and good, but because morality is impossible without freedom, and freedom gives to all newly created minds the possibility and the liability to sin. Sin as sin is impossible to created minds only when they have learned that obedience is the best thing possible, and when they can have no motive or desire to sin.

This brief allusion to the sources whence come nearly the sum total of our miseries, physical and moral, is sufficient to show us that the human race is the author of its own miseries; that these miseries form no necessary part of the divine plan, that they are simply the inevitable consequences of human lawlessness which has its source in supreme selfishness. True it is we are accustomed to regard many things as evils that lie quite beyond control; such as floods, cyclones and earthquakes. It is, however, probable that if the world of mankind were living in full accord with the will of our beneficent Father and were free from all the evils brought on us by our lawlessness, the flood, the cyclone and the earthquake, and even physical death itself would not be regarded as

evils or calamities at all. We may very well pity those that bring ruin upon themselves; the murderer, who by his lawlessness brings himself to the scaffold. But we should not blame the law under which he suffers or the law-makers whose motives are wise and good. We should rather blame the lawlessness that brought his ruin.

We may very properly pity the world while writhing in its physical and moral agonies produced by its own lawlessness; but we should not question the wisdom or beneficence of the law whose transgressions have caused these agonies; nor the love of the divine Father who has imposed these laws for our good.

While men are taught to regard God simply as their creator who has a right to their obedience, because he has created them, will they be inclined to render only a reluctant obedience. So long as men are taught that his object in their creation is for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures will they be little inclined to serve him.

So long as they are taught that the supreme end of his law is a vindication of his rights as their creator and proprietor, having no special adaptation to their good, so long will men find it hard to trust and love him. They may fear him slavishly and obey him cringingly as a captive his captor, or a slave his master, or a satrap his superior, but not otherwise.

Not until men recognize God as their Father who loves them, protects them, pities them as kind parents pity their children, do they truly trust him,

reverence, love and obey him with a cheerful, happy delight. We all know that the predominant tendency of pulpit performances for more than a thousand years has been to make conspicuously prominent the divine creatorship and its autocratic prerogatives, and to leave in the dark background the divine Fatherhood.

In this losing sight of the divine Fatherhood and making prominent the divine creatorship and governorship, the attribute of divine justice has been pressed out of all past relations in that it has been made to dominate all the other attributes, thus making it incompatible with mercy, and, logically, (happily only *logically*) making God himself unable to pardon without first punishing his ignorant and erring children in a substitute.

Surely it is no marvel that our popular Christianity has achieved so little in comparison with what its friends think it ought to have accomplished. Certainly God is immutably just, is never unjust. But this is not incompatible with mercy. If it were, pardon would be forever impossible. No unjust act is merciful, and no unmerciful act is just. Divine justice and divine mercy are simply obverse aspects of the same divine wisdom and love. This view of justice and mercy presents a brighter prospect to the world, being in full harmony with the Fatherhood of God. Happily for Christianity the divine Fatherhood is coming into greater prominence in the pulpit and religious literature than has been accorded for centuries; and this fact is prophetic of greater triumphs of the cross in the future.

Let men generally come to recognize God as their loving, merciful Father, who notwithstanding their unnatural rebellion, pities them that fear him as a father pitieth his children; that he is merciful and gracious, slow to anger and plenteous in mercy, that all he requires of them is strictly and literally for their good; that he doth not afflict willingly, that he has no pleasure in the death of the wicked; that their punishments are the inevitable consequences of their own sins; that if they suffer punishment now and hereafter it is all their own fault, and not from any necessity imposed upon them by a natural or a supernatural providence; let men come to know and appreciate these facts in their true light and as sure as day follows night men will cease to regard God as a merciless tyrant instead of a loving Father who could not create men simply to damn them for his own glory, they will cease to regard themselves as the hapless and helpless victims of a tyrant that afflicts them simply for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures.

On the contrary, recognizing God as a loving Father—as their Father who doth not afflict willingly, who has no pleasure in the death of the wicked, who is willing to forgive iniquity, transgression and sin, who is anxious to receive with open arms and heart the returning prodigal—men will see their sins in a light they never saw them before. They will see and feel their ingratitude, folly and shame as never before. If they do not repent and return to a cheerful obedience to their Father's will, they will at least cease to question

his love and to charge their unhappiness to his purposes concerning them. They will come to know there is immunity from evil only in obedience to law or God's will. This is equally true both of physical and moral law. Hence lawlessness is the means by which we bring upon ourselves innumerable physical and moral evils, and obedience to law the only means of averting evils both of body and mind. The remedy for moral evils is found in Soteriology, or the science of salvation.

CHAPTER V.

SIN, TRANSGRESSION AND INIQUITY.

(Continued.)

THESE terms are expressive of the same general idea, either of lawless acts or lawless mental states of the actors, and are consequently interchangeably used in the Sacred Scriptures. The characteristics of one of these terms may be accepted as the essential characteristics of all of them.

SEC. I.—*Sin as an act.*—Sin is of two essentially different kinds.

Voluntary acts of disobedience to the known will or law of God, such as the sin of the first man in eating the forbidden fruit, the treachery of Judas and many others named in the Bible. This is the most aggravated form of sin, and subjects the perpetrator to the severest penalties. “He that knoweth his master’s will and doeth it not shall be beaten with many stripes.”

Voluntary acts in violation of the unknown law or will of God. These acts constitute what are recognized as sins of ignorance. Though less flagrant than those previously named, still they are sins and subject those that commit them to the loss of that good or blessing that comes from obedience to law. Such is the condition of those that know not the law. (Such must be punished morally according to

their knowledge of the law. This is a fair inference from the parable of the talents and other Bible facts.) This punishment, I suppose, must consist in the deprivation of good, as in the deprivation of health by violation of human law, rather than in the infliction of positive evil, as in remorse of conscience and a sense of self-degradation.

SEC. II.—*Sin as a state*.—The words sin and iniquity are in the Scriptures often used to express not an act but a state or habit resulting from voluntary action, directly or indirectly. We know that our acts of perception, also our acts of will, our purposes and endeavors produce corresponding states of mind or bring the mind into different relations to the objects perceived, or purposed or done.

In accordance with this universal law every sinful act is followed by a corresponding sinful state of mind, because of the inseparable relations between act and state the same word is used to express sometimes the act and sometimes the state. This simple state is never produced and in the nature of the case can never be produced except by a voluntary act, but this sinful state having been thus produced by the voluntary act of one man in himself may be transmitted to his progeny by heredity, just as any other physical or moral quality may be transmitted. This fact is fully avouched both by the science of heredity and by the sacred Scriptures. Hence a sinful state may be truthfully affirmed of children that have committed no sinful act.

2. That the words sin and iniquity are often used to express a state and not an act might be proved by scores of Bible texts. A few instances of such use of these terms will be sufficient for my purpose.

(1) "Wash me thoroughly from mine iniquity and cleanse me from my sin." Psal. li.2. It is a common characteristic of Hebrew poetry, that the same idea is repeated by the use of equivalent terms. In this text the words "*iniquity*" and "*sin*" mean the same thing, so do the words "*wash*" and "*cleanse*." Now it is evident from mere inspection that the words "*sin*" and "*iniquity*" here mean a state and not an act; for it would be little less than nonsense to speak of cleansing or washing an *act*. Plainly enough it is the actor and not the act that need sto be cleansed, and is capable of being cleansed or washed.

(2) "I was shapen (formed or brought forth) in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." Psal. li.5. Here sin and iniquity obviously mean a sinful state and not a sinful act; otherwise the text would teach that David was a child of adultery or that all conception was sin. This text also teaches with sufficient precision and force that children are born in a depraved or sinful state. Three remarks may here be pertinently made:

First, we need not and should not with the Calvinist predicate of infant condemnation or liability to punishment simply because the infant is born in this sinful state; (a) because in its irrational state it is not the subject of moral law at all; (b) because in that it is not liable to moral retribution at all; for accord-

ing to our Confession of Faith, dying in an irrational state it is "regenerated and saved."

Secondly, we need not and should not with some Armenians predicate of the infant justification and a fitness for eternal life; (a) because as previously said it is not the subject of moral law and, (b) because if born in a sinful state, it is not in a state of spiritual life, and consequently needs to be put into that state or relieved of its sinful state.

Thirdly, when reason and the moral sense are so far developed that the child can distinguish between right and wrong, it comes under law or is required to love God, and failing to do this necessarily passes under condemnation, or becomes by nature a child of wrath as in actual transgression. Possibly children under highly advantageous circumstances may come to love Christ and actually pass from a state of death unto life before they are capable of any distinct sense of moral accountability.

(3) "Therefore as through one man (Adam) sin entered into the world (humanity), and death (spiritual and no other) through sin; and so death passed unto all men for that all sinned." Rom. v.12. This text through ages has been the puzzle of exegetes. It is confessedly difficult and much of this difficulty arises, I think, from taking the word "sin" as expression of an act instead of the consequence of an act; or as the expression of a sinful act instead of a sinful state, as it is often taken in other texts. This is, I suspect, the chief source of difficulty.

(a) "Sin entered into the world." There is some-

thing grotesque and solecistic in the idea of sin as an act entering into the world or human beings. It is unintelligible and, of course, inexplicable. On the contrary the words "through one man sin entered into the world," if we take the word "sin" to mean a sinful state, become intelligible and capable of rational explanation. We have only to admit that Adam by willful disobedience corrupted his moral nature, and then by generation transmitted that sinful state to his posterity. This view without any aid from realism in any form or fiat imputation gives us at once a rational and scriptural account of the introduction of sin into humanity.

(b) "Death, (entered into the world, humanity) by or through sin." (Spiritual death alone is here intended as will be subsequently shown.) Sin as a willful act is causative of sin as a state or causative of a sinful state, and sin as a state is followed by death as its wages or natural consequences; just as education, as an act, is causative of education as a state, and education as a state of the mind is followed by the advantages of this state, or as a criminal act is causative of a criminal state which is followed by penal consequences.

(c) "And so death passed (over) unto all men." The word *passed over* teaches that Adam's spiritual death is transmitted, of course, by heredity to his posterity. This fact condemns both realism or the idea that all men voluntarily participated in the first human sin; and also condemns federal imputation; for what a man voluntarily does himself does not pass over to him, nor is it imputed to him or

become his by federal representations, but it is strictly his own act and its necessary consequences are the products of his own act.

(d) "So that (because or inasmuch as) all sinned." Does the word "sinned" here express an act or a state resulting from an act? Some say the former, and some the latter. All actually sinned in a previous state of existence, answers the pre-existentist. All actually sinned in Adam answers the realists. No one actually sinned except the first man, but his sin was imputed to all his posterity, answers the federal imputationist. The pre-existentist and the realist make the word "sinned" express a literal, voluntary act. The federalist makes it express not a voluntary act, but the judicial visitation of Adam's corruption and guilt upon his posterity; *i. e.*, all are accounted and treated as sinners, not because they have actually sinned, but because Adam as their federal head or representative actually sinned. The federalist is, I think, right in denying that the word *sinned* in this case expresses a voluntary act, but radically wrong in attributing the death in which all are involved to any artificial contrivance, such as federal headship, or any other fiction. Federal headship and natural headship cannot be co-causes of depravity. If a child resembles its father it is not because he is its legal representative and protector, but because he is its progenitor. Federal headship is just as incompetent to account for human depravity as is pre-existentism or realism. Natural headship or progenitorship only can give an intelligible and satis-

factory explanation of the source of depravity.

But if we take the word "sinned" in this text to express not an act, but a state resulting from an act, then we must take it in a metonymical sense, or put the cause for the effect. Are we justifiable in doing this? I think we are. This figure of speech is often used in the scriptures. Paul used it in this very connection (v. 14), when he said, "Death reigns from Adam to Moses." As we have seen from v. 12, sin is causative of death; and in v. 21, it is said that "sin hath reigned unto death." Here the *reign*, which in v. 21 is attributed to sin, the real cause of death is in v. 14, attributed to death; that is, death, the effect, is put for sin, the cause. So the words "all sinned" are by metonymy put for *all become sinners*, or *subjects of sinful state* and, for this reason, the victims of spiritual death, the consequences of this sinful state.

This view, I think, frees the subject from the embarrassment in which pre-existentism, realism and federalism have each respectively involved it.

It releases us from the absurdity of believing that men lived and sinned in a previous state of which they now have no knowledge.

It releases us from the absurdity of saying that men lived in this world and actually sinned voluntarily thousands of years before they were born, of which events they now have no knowledge.

It releases us from the absurdity of attributing depravity to two different and conflicting causes; viz., To federal headship and natural headship. It

is the least difficult of rational explanation and defense, and is therefore presumably the correct view of the subject.

SEC. III.—*Sin as a state subjects us to punishment.*—The preceding discussion of sin as an *act* and sin as a *state* enables us the better to understand the real ground of punishment and also the nature of moral retribution. Men are punished for their sins. This is a uniform teaching of the Bible and experience confirms the fact.

But the question arises: Are they punished for their acts as such? or for their mental states whence their external acts proceed? Most persons, if they speak without reflection, would answer, For their acts. Due reflection, however, would cause them to reverse this answer and say that subjects of moral law are rewarded and punished for their mental states and not for their external acts. It is true that a volition, a mental act, primarily determines the mental state. But it is the mental state, the intention, that subjects us to punishment. The external act is ordinarily an expression of intention and, of itself or apart from the mental state, has no moral character.

This is true even in human laws concerning crime and is pre-eminently so in moral law. Guiteau was not hung for the act of shooting Garfield, but for the state of mind with which he did the act. If it had been proved that the shooting was accidental, or unintentional; that his mind was

morally right, without bad feeling or evil intention, he would not have been hung.

So it is in all criminal cases. Men are punished for what they are rather than for what they do, or for their sinful states rather than their external acts. Because of the difficulty of determining the exact state of the mind of the criminal human tribunals, no doubt, make many mistakes, sometimes awarding greater and sometimes less punishment than the real measure of guilt requires.

The rule holds with infallible certainty in relation to morals. Adam became a criminal at heart, a criminal in fact when he formed the purpose to eat the forbidden fruit, or before he stretched forth his hand to take it.

The external acts of putting forth his hand and eating the fruit were mere expressions of a previously formed purpose, or pre-existent state of mind. We call the external act sinful not because it was intrinsically so, but because it was the product and expression of a prior sinful state of mind. Having fully formed the purpose to eat, had the external act of eating been by any means prevented, he would have been as truly a sinner as the man that hates his brother is a murderer though he never commits the external act of killing. In both these cases—in fact in all cases—it is sin as a state rather than sin as an act that subjects to moral retribution.

SEC. IV.—*The relation of sin and its punishment.*—Sin and its punishment are related exactly

as an act and its natural consequences, as cause and effects. The punishment comes naturally out of the sinful state; is inseparable from it, is not something adventitious or arbitrarily added to it, but is its own natural product. Hence "to be carnally minded (in a sinful state) is death." The wages (the natural or divinely established consequences) of sin is death. (Rom. vi. 23.) "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap. He that soweth to his flesh shall of the flesh also reap corruption;" i.e., destruction. (Gal. vi. 8.) These and other texts show that punishment is unseparable from sin as a state of the mind or heart. Not more surely does pain follow a diseased state of the body than does punishment follow a sinful state of the heart.

Very high human authority says, "There is no sin so small but it deserves damnation." No one ought either affirm or deny this proposition without explanation and it is easier to make a new statement than to satisfactorily explain the old one. The Bible never so states the relation of sin and penalty; never says sin deserves punishment, or ought to be punished, or merits punishment. It rather teaches that sins or sinners are *punished*, or *shall be punished*, or that sins are causative of punishment, as sickness is causative of suffering or death. No one would say that sickness ought to produce pain, or deserves pain. This would be equivalent to saying that the cause ought to produce its effects or deserves its effects. We do not properly predicate deservedness or oughtness or obliga-

tion or liability of what is absolutely necessary. ✓

It is only when we conceive that men are punished for their sinful acts, rather than for their sinful state, and that the punishment is objective and separable from the sinful state that we talk of what penalties sin deserves, or ought to be inflicted upon sinners. This corruption rests upon the assumption of an analogy between human and divine law which does not exist and of course gives a false and pernicious notion of the relations of sin and its punishment. The sinner, at least in his ordinary state of mind, not being conscious that his sin "deserves (external) damnation," very naturally comes to regard God, not as his Father loving and merciful, but as unmerciful and perhaps as unjust, and is consequently repelled rather than drawn to him. On the contrary, if the sinner is made to know that God is his loving Father, more willing to forgive than he is to be forgiven, and that the penalties to which his sin subjects him are the natural and subjective consequences of his own sinful state, he will be more likely to cease his reproaches against the goodness of God and turn against himself as the guilty cause of his own wretchedness.

Let the sinner be made to know that the state of his own mind and heart determines the nature and severity of his punishment and that so long as he continues in his state of enmity to God and insubordination to his will he must suffer, he will be more inclined to take heed to his ways and leave off his sins.

✓ SEC. V.—*Sin and its pardon*.—If the above expressed views of the relation of sin and its penalties are true, then we cannot fail to see the unreasonableness of all theological schemes that proceed on the assumption that sin and its penalties are separable one from the other—absolutely capable of such complete separation that one man may be the criminal and the other man bear the punishment; or as it is sometimes expressed, one may bear the *reatus culpæ* and another man bear the *reatus poenæ*; and that the punishment of any sin, or all sin, may be borne by one person thousands of years before it is committed by the other party.

✓ According to the advocates of this theory the punishment of sin is purely objective, as really so as is the punishment of a thief who receives “forty stripes save one,” or the punishment of an ox.

The advocates of this scheme themselves admit (at least those that know anything about it) that if the punishment of sin is subjective, then it is impossible for one person to bear the criminality and another the penalty.

✓ Now I wish in this connection only to say that this method of pardon is not only unreasonable but is equally unscriptural. According to the scheme Christ actually suffered the punishment proper to all for whom he died and by consequence released all such from all penalty. But the Bible tells us that this is not true, that the wrath of God abideth upon unbelievers, and such are condemned already.

Again, the scriptures nowhere teach that Christ

came to bear, or that he did bear, or take away or blot out the penalties of sin.

On the contrary the scriptures teach in the most explicit manner that he came to put away sin, not its penalties, by the sacrifice of himself; that he bore our sins (not our penalties) in his own body on the tree; that it is our sins and not their penalties, that are *blotted out, remitted, forgiven, pardoned*. Of what use would it be, were such a thing possible, to take away the penalty and to leave the sin that caused it intact? Or to take the effect and leave the cause in full vigor? The physician in treating his patient does not deal with the pain, but with the disease that causes it. In like manner Christ, the great physician, in his visible ministry did not deal with the suffering, physical and mental, of men but with their disease, taking away, blotting out, forgiving their sins or changing their physical and mental states to a normal from the abnormal states in which their sufferings had their origin. He did not take away the sufferings of Peter's wife's mother and leave the fever in her; or relieve the demoniac of his sufferings and leave the legion of devils in him. When he said, "Son, be of good cheer; thy sins be forgiven thee," he did not take away the punishment of pain and leave the sins unmolested, but relieved the paralytic of the sins which cause his sufferings. Never did he deal with the penalties of sin as something separate from sins themselves. Never did he take away the punishment except by taking away the sins which produced them. In this respect

physical and moral laws are strictly analagous.

Such facts show us exactly what is meant by blotting out, remitting, forgiving and pardoning sins, iniquities and transgression, viz: It is not to take away or relieve us of punishment or liability to punishment, but to *free us, deliver us, save us* from the sinful state which produces this punishment.

In view of such facts how inexpressibly abhorrent to reason and to revelation is the doctrine that Christ bore the guilt and punishment of sin—the sins of all or of a part of mankind, but left the sins themselves undisturbed? Or that he by a substitutionary and penal death took away our *reatus poenae*, but did not and could not in that manner take away our *reatus culpae* or sinful state? If this doctrine was true it would exempt all for whom Christ died from all the natural punishments both in this life and in the life to come, as truly so as would the payment of a debt by a substitute exempt the principal from obligation to pay it, for there would be no debt to pay.

A governor invested with pardoning power may release a convict from the penalty awarded him by the court. Substitutionists sometimes deceive themselves by thoughtlessly assuming the penalties of moral law to be analagous to those of the civil law, and that as the governor sets aside civil penalties without any actual change in the state of the convict's mind, so Christ could and did set aside the penalties of those for whom he suffered without any antecedent change of their sinful state.

But it should be carefully noted that there is no

analogy between civil and divine law in this respect. The civil law is not written on the heart—is not a connection of the mind itself. The moral is so written.

The penalties of civil law are purely objective and are for this reason separable from the mental states of the criminal. The penalties of the moral law are subjective and are consequently inseparable from the actual state of the transgressor. Hence no one can take my punishments without taking the actual state of my mind, my criminality, my sense of guilt and my conscience. Nor can I possibly be delivered from my punishment except by antecedent change of mind and heart. This needful change is identical with pardon, remission, forgiveness of sin. It is represented in the Bible as a washing, a cleansing, a healing, a renewal, a regenerating, a creating anew, a purging of the conscience from dead works to serve the living God.

This presentation of the divine law and its reasonable requirements; of sin, penalty and pardon, which is here but imperfectly given, is not only in harmony with our Confession of Faith, but is in part, in every essential point, the only explanation, of which it logically admits. See Con. Faith, sections 66-70.

Parenthetically it may be stated as a fact of some interest that, so far as I know, our New Confession of Faith is the first doctrinal symbol that formally declares a difference between the ordinary and natural punishments of sin and judicial and extraordinary punishments, making the former subjec-

tive and the latter objective. The seventieth (70) section is in these words: "The penalties of this law are the natural and subjective consequences of transgression, and unless set aside by the provisions of the gospel must of necessity be eternal; and such they are declared to be by the Holy Scriptures. These moral retributions must be distinguished from judicial punishment which are arbitrary, objective and temporary, and are always inflicted as occasion may require for administrative purposes."

CHAPTER VI.

THE RELATION OF SIN TO NATURAL OR PHYSICAL EVIL.

SEC. I.—*Does sin sustain a causal relation to all evil, physical as well as moral?*

BY many it has been and is yet so regarded. But there are evidently many things properly regarded as evils or calamities that have no dependence upon sin. These may be classified as follows:

(1) *Evils resulting from the operation of physical forces in the inorganic world.* While these forces are, on the whole, highly beneficial and no doubt necessary to the well-being of both the physical and moral world, they nevertheless are often destructive to human life and happiness. Through the operation of these forces of nature, under a divine superintendence, the world has always been subjected to rains, winds, floods and volcanic actions, earthquakes, excessive heat and cold, etc. By these agencies of nature millions of valuable property have been lost, millions of valuable lives destroyed, millions of fond hopes blighted, and whole communities and States filled with anguish and woe. That these forces and human sin have no causal connection is evident from the fact that they existed according to the revelations of geology unnum-

bered ages prior to the man-period of the earth's history. Sin, from its inherent nature, has no more power to produce them than they have to produce sin. They are the forces God has ordained for the conservation of the physical world, and though they existed and operated long anterior to man, yet if God chose to use them for purposes of moral administration, as we know he sometimes does, this does not imply that they have any dependency upon moral evil, or moral evil upon them. Or if the earth had been intended for habitation by a race of beings no higher in the scale of being than beasts and birds, these same forces would have existed, just as they now do, and the same results would have followed, so far as these inferior creatures are concerned, that now occur.

(2) *Evils resulting from the operation of the laws of vegetable life and death.*

The world, for various reasons, could not exist without the flora or vegetable kingdom. Both man and animal without vegetables would certainly perish with hunger. Their effects on man and beasts are in many ways highly beneficent; yet various evils often come from this beneficent provision of nature. Vegetation powerfully modifies the temperature, hence the prevailing of heat and cold. Its decay often generates bad air, miasmatic poisons, and brings on terrible epidemics, and epizootics, destructive to men and beasts. These epidemics that destroy men and beasts by the thousand, are esteemed great evils, but the natural forces that produce them existed and operated no doubt on the

animal kingdom long before man existed at all, and hence can sustain no causal relation to sin. If God in his providence chose to use such instrumentalities for administrative purposes in the moral world as he doubtless does, he of course is at liberty to do so and then bring moral good out of physical evil.

(3) *Evils resulting from the laws of instincts of the animal creation.*

The design of these laws is the conservation and perpetuation of animal life, and their general tendency is beneficial, whether we consider the animals themselves or the human race, as the objects of beneficence. But from this source of benefactions evils often result, both to animals and to men. Some of these animals are strictly herbivorous, others are carnivorous, and others are called omnivorous. Now while the animal creation seems indispensable to man there are two classes of evils incident to man from this source. First, human food and clothing are largely derived from animals. The domestic animals have become property in all ages, and have constituted a large part of the food and property of man. But these have always been the coveted prey of the more powerful carnivorous tribes, and consequently great losses in property are sustained from this source. Hence, in all newly-settled countries one of the first public necessities is to free the country from the natural enemies to man's secular good. The extermination of these vicious beasts seems to have formed a large part of the exploits of the fabulous Hercules.

Samson, too, was a laborer in this department of philanthropy. David had adventures with a lion and a bear. Now the economy of the animal world was established long prior to the creation of man, and it is certainly a fair inference that if the human race had become numerous without having sinned this evil would have existed as it does now. That is, the wolf nor the lion would no more respect the lamb or the kid of a righteous man than of a sinner. A second evil from this source is man's liability to lose his life as well as his property. This is so now, and we have no reasonable ground to suppose it would be otherwise if man had never sinned. On the contrary hypothesis we have to suppose that the creator changed the nature of the instincts, and also the mechanical structure of the animal world, on account of Adam's sin. But this would be an assumption as ridiculous as incredible. In fine, to answer on this point that Adam's sin and all natural evil are causally connected, is to assume that in consequence of that sin the creator has materially changed the whole course of nature in organized matter; in the vegetable and in the animal creation, or else to suppose that God, in case of man's perpetual obedience, would have wrought a perpetual miracle in defending him from the numerous evils to which he would have been subjected from these sources. But we have no right to assume any such miracle for such a purpose, for it is abundantly demonstrated that man was never an object of deeper solicitude and greater providential care before his fall than he has been since. Yet

we know that all these evils do now come upon him, hence the inference that they would have come upon him if he had never sinned.

But there are possible evils arising from a want of food, raiment, etc. Suppose sin had not entered the world, and the rates of increase of the sinless race had been equal to what it has actually been, then there is a strong presumption amounting almost to certainty that suffering in some cases would have resulted on the score of physical discomfort. The hypothesis that there would have been no deaths but for sin increases this presumption an hundredfold. Even according to the chronology about two hundred generations have passed away. Suppose the average population of these generations to have been only half of the present population of the globe the number of its dead would be one hundred times as great as the number of the living with the knowledge actually possessed by mankind. Could such a number be accommodated with food, fuel, raiment and shelter? I should think not, without a continual miracle, which we have no right to suppose.

Of all natural evils death is regarded as the greatest by all men except a few crazy suicides. Now it is pertinent to inquire whether natural death, in all its phases, is a penal consequence of sin. Augustine believed the Adamic sin was the cause of death to man and also to all other animals, and this irrational figment has had a very strong hold on the religious mind. He was very certain animals never would have died in Eden had not sin been

originated. Had he lived in the nineteenth century his mystic tendencies would not have carried him so far. He would have been content to allow sin to be the cause of physical death to human beings only, and would have allowed the animals to die, seeing God had so constituted some species as to make their subsistence dependent on the flesh of others. You ask the physiologist, the anatomist, the scientist generally, whether Christian or infidel, whether the creator intended man to live eternally in the animal body as when first created. They will answer emphatically, "No." The basis of this conclusion is, man is an organized being and hence from a necessity inherent in his nature he, like all other organized beings, plants and animals, must die.

If you suggest to the infidel scientist that sin is the cause of death he will laugh at your credulity. If you suggest the same idea to a Christian scientist he will probably suggest that you must either misinterpret the Bible in its general teachings on the subject, or take the word death in a sense not intended by the inspired writers. Now the book of nature and the book of revelation are both from God. He is as truly the author of the one as of the other. When the students of these books make them contradict each other God is misinterpreted.

SEC. II.—*Are death and all human sufferings penal?*—In this connection I propose to consider the question: Are natural death and all its physical

sufferings punishments for sin in the person of the sufferer?

The affirmative of this question has been pertinaciously asserted from the day of Augustine to the present hour. But when we inquire for the proof of this proposition we are utterly amazed at its scantiness.

Let us briefly glance at the proof. Gen. ii. 19: "In the day," etc. It is assumed that death in this verse is to be understood in a complex sense, so as to include both spiritual and physical death. But it is, as far as I can see, an assumption without any conclusive proof. This interpretation seems to me impossible for the following reasons:

1. All the facts stated in the previous chapter concerning sin and natural evil afford powerful presumption against this interpretation, for if natural evil existed before Adam, natural death has no causal relation to sin. Then of course natural evil cannot be the punishment of sin or any part of that punishment. ✓

2. That the word *death* is often used to express the separation of the soul from God, and is also often used to express the separation of soul and body, is readily admitted. But what authority have we for believing that this single word death in this text is intended to express both these ideas? Is it used in the complex or double sense in any other text in the Bible or in any human composition? If so, where? Is any other word in the Bible used in any single proposition without qualification to express at one and the same time two

ideas so essentially distinct as that of spiritual and physical death? I do not know one. Indeed if this were the rule, language, instead of being a vehicle for conveying clear and distinct thought, would be only a source of endless confusion. Though most words are more or less ambiguous, yet we are imperatively required by the laws of interpretation to take them in every instance of their use in one of their accepted meanings and not in more than one. With the application of this obvious and necessary rule to the word in hand, we are not at liberty to assert that death, natural, spiritual and eternal, is here intended to be expressed. We must, in all fairness, say one thing and not many, is intended. But all admit that spiritual death is at least a part of the penalty. Then if we infer that Adam did die spiritually, spiritual death, and not natural death, was intended.

3. The penalty threatened was immediate death and it is allowed that spiritual death did instantly intervene the instant Adam purposed to eat the fruit, even before he had accomplished the external act. This literally verifies the truth of the text. But if natural death was a part of the penalty intended in the text, then its truthfulness was not verified, for he did not die according to the natural import of the text, but lived according to our chronology more than nine hundred years. If it should be said that though he did not die instantly, yet he was instantly put under condemnation to death, the event itself being deferred by the mediation of Christ, then I briefly reply, (a) That this view does

not interpret the text, but largely supplements it. To be put under condemnation to death and to die are two very distinct things, especially when separated by a period of nine hundred years. If Adam became a pious and good man, as is generally allowed, I can very well imagine that he, like good old Simeon, learned to long for an event which would prove to him the end of all earthly ill and a gate to endless joy. Not much curse, not much penal anguish in that death. (b) If the mediation of Christ availed to defer one part of the penalty for nine hundred years and then convert it into a blessing, why did it not avail to defer the other part of the penalty also? As it did not avail in one case we have no authority, so far as I know, to believe it did in the other. The text fairly treated is unfavorable to the idea that natural death is any part of the penalty threatened in Eden. This conclusion is supported by the following facts:

Adam when called to account for his sin seemed to stand in no apprehension of natural death. When called to account by his creator he said: "I heard thy voice in the garden and was afraid because I was naked and hid myself." He is truly afraid but the ground of that fear was not the apprehension of death but, as he alleges, his nakedness. He was deeply and painfully conscious of the moral effect of his sin, but seems to have thought of no natural evil. Now if physical death was a part of the penalty Adam certainly knew it and when brought face to face with his creator and judge would have had his thoughts fixed upon his

liability to instant death rather than upon the simple fact that he was naked. But not a word of such explanation is given, and the reasonable explanation is that what does not exist needs no explanation. Gen. iii. 14, 19, is very much relied on to prove that natural death is a penal infliction upon Adam and by imputation upon his posterity. Perhaps no paragraph in the Bible has been more abused by learned critics and exegetes than this which is commonly called the Adamic curse.

2 An extreme rationalism that seeks to eliminate from the Bible every element of the supernatural is certainly a dangerous form of error. But an extreme literalism that seeks to eliminate the natural and replace it with the supernatural is perhaps not less dangerous. Modern as well as ancient commentators seem to lose sight of the highly anthropomorphic and anthropopathic character of the Old Testament scriptures, especially of the first part of Genesis. Also of the very important fact that what is done by human agency and occurs by laws of matter, and also the laws of mind, is ascribed to the supernatural agency of God. And the natural is excluded and the supernatural is made to take its place. Thus the Great Spirit is represented as walking, or standing, or planting a garden in Eden, or making coats of skins to clothe Adam and Eve, as driving man out of the garden and placing there a cherubim to keep the way of the tree of life.

This method of expression, I suppose, was necessary in the state of human knowledge then exist-

ing. Adam knew something, perhaps much, of God through this anthropomorphic mode of communication, but from the necessity of the case he knew nothing or but very little of nature or God in nature. Hence almost everything both the natural and the supernatural were indiscriminately ascribed to the supernatural. But in our interpretation of the Bible we must discriminate as far as possible between the natural and supernatural and, as has been said before, we must never admit the supernatural except where the natural is utterly inadequate to account for the facts that may have to do with the subject in hand. On any other plan we confound things in themselves essentially distinct, render the supernatural incredible and resolve all religion either into a cold rationalism or a blank superstition. God never uses extraordinary means when ordinary ones will do just as well. ✓

Now the exegetical vice that results from a disregard of these common sense principles is committed, I believe, in this explanation of this so-called Adamic curse. Gen. iii. 14, 19.

1. I understand the curse to be purely subjective, or that all the evils here specified were the necessary consequences of alienation from God. These consequences affected nothing outside the guilty parties themselves. ✓

2. The serpent was not a beast of the field. The words by which he is designated say he was more subtle than any beast of the field. Of course, then he was no mere serpent, whatever may have been his form. Satan, it is allowed, was the serpent. }

He was cursed for this as for all other sins, for every sin brings a curse. This crawling upon his belly and eating dust, if the reference be to Satan, must be taken metaphorically.

As crawling upon the belly is a skulking and unobtrusive as well as a degrading mode of movement, so the movement of Satan, as eating dust is a low means of subsistence, so the enjoyments of Satan. If a literal curse is meant the curse pronounced upon him is, of course, symbolical, or he certainly crawled upon his belly as literally before the fall as after it and no more truly ate dirt after than before it. The serpent, I take it, was in no sense injured by the fall, unless to be used as a symbol of Satan might seem an injustice. If he is conscious of this fact, he has not taken it much to heart. He had his natural enemies before as after the fall.

3. The curse upon the woman consisted of two points: First, the multiplication of her sorrow; and second, subjection to her husband. The language fairly implies that if she had never sinned she would have had sorrow. We cannot multiply nothing into something. Hence sin did not originate, only multiplied, it. As to her subjection to her husband, it is certainly true that she was created in that state. Her sin did not originate that subjection, it only rendered possible some household trouble and family broils, the natural consequence of sin as it is yet.

4. The special points in Adam's case are as follows: "Cursed is the ground for thy sake," or on

thy account in relation to thee. The ground was cursed not on its own account but on Adam's. This directs attention to Adam as the offender, and as the real object of the curse, for we are not at liberty to suppose that the ground became a substitute for him or was punished in his stead.

If the curse was objective then the physical condition of the earth was materially changed. The supposition that God deprived it in part of its fertility, and changed to some extent its flora, exterminating some of its most valuable fruit bearing trees and plants, and causing less valuable ones, as thorns and thistles to grow in their places is without sufficient proof. We learn from Genesis that God created the flora of the earth on the third of the creative days. But if this objective theory is true, then after the fall of man God revised his own work and changed its form from the better to the worse. But is it admissible to suppose, or is it creditable, that God did create thorns and thistles as a means of tormenting poor guilty men? This it seems to me is quite too anthropomorphic, or rather too diabolomorphic to receive the assent of any intelligent mind. There were a thousand other methods of punishing the culprit without defacing the fair works of his own divine hand. If the subjective theory be true then we are at liberty to believe that God created the thorn and the thistle on the third creative day when he created the other flora and that he did not on the occasion of Adam's sin in a rage of towering passion fall upon his own beautiful work to despoil it of its excellency. What

✓ a wonderful change is that which occurs when a sinner who has all his life regarded Christ as a root out of dry ground, having neither form nor comeliness, and suddenly comes to regard him the chief of ten thousand, and the one altogether lovely. Or when a sinner united to Christ by faith feels that he is a new creature, that old things have passed away and all things have become new. Wonderful changes are these. But where is the change, in the object or in the subject, in Christ or in the sinner? Everyone knows how to answer this question. The change is purely subjective in the sinner's heart. It is a well-known philosophical truth that things external to ourselves are to us for the time being just what we esteem them to be. That is the soul throws its inner light or inner darkness over everything around it, and things are esteemed comely or uncomely, good or bad, blessings or curses, according to the prevalence of this inner light and darkness.

According to the subjective theory the thorn and the thistles grew as truly and abundantly before the fall as after it, but they were not sources of annoyance to the innocent pair in Paradise, because they did not esteem them evil. Duty was a pleasure, and if occasion required the removal of a thorn or thistle it was no less a pleasure than any other duty. It gave no occasion of dark brooding over objective evils, provoked no impatience or murmurings against nature or providence, or God. No complainings against a hard lot. The ground brought forth thorns and thistles, but they were no thorns

to them, or no occasion of discontent, or disquietude or unhappiness to them.

The third evil pronounced against Adam was that he should eat bread by the sweat of his face. Here the evil falls directly upon the sinner. The point of interest in this respect is, was this the result of sin? What has been said previously will aid us in the solution of this question. Man was made for activity, for labor both physical and mental, and his subsistence and comforts were conditional upon his labor. God gave him the means of acquiring these, but he was required to use the means God had given just as he does now and always will do. The first recorded command the creator ever gave the newly created pair contained the specific injunction to subdue the earth. Here was work in abundance for both brain and muscle, and when the garden was planted Adam was put in charge of it with the injunction to dress and keep it. These commands, be it remembered, were given before the fall. Hence it is certain man was made to labor, and to live by his labor. This was as much the order of nature before the fall as after it. What then can be meant when it is said to him after the fall, "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread?" Nothing more than that his own sinful, querulous and discontented nature should greatly embitter that which before the fall was both a duty and a pleasure. What was before esteemed a pleasure—a delightful recreation—is now esteemed a drudgery, a hard necessity, a calamity, a curse. The change is in the man, not in the soils or seasons, nor in his

dependence upon personal exertion for subsistence and comfort. The change that came over man in regard to labor may be imperfectly represented by the marked difference between individuals in regard to both muscular and brain labor, also by the difference in the same individual at different periods of his history. What some esteem a pleasure others esteem a hard necessity and make it the occasion of a continual self-torture. Some children hate labor, mental and physical, but afterwards learn to love one or both. Now all this results from subjective and not objective causes, from the state of mind and not things external to ourselves. This illustrates the nature of the evil brought on our race by sin and on us, i. e., by a subjective and not objective process.

I wish now before I close this brief reference to the Adamic curse to contrast the two schemes of interpretation.

For the sake of brevity let A. be the objective, B. the subjective scheme. A. asserts that the changes wrought upon the several parties concerned were supernatural, objective and physical. B. denies and asserts that the changes were natural, subjective and moral. A. asserts that the changes were wrought by the direct fiat of the creator. B. denies and asserts that the changes were the necessary results of second causes, or of the corruption of the moral nature by rebellion against the creator. A. asserts that the serpent before the fall moved erect, or in some way different from its subsequent mode of movement. That it was so changed in its physical

structure and habits that it crawled upon its belly and ate dust. B. denies and holds that the literal serpent is a symbol of Satan and the evils pronounced upon it are symbolical of the characteristics and doom of that "old serpent, the devil," and that the literal serpent was not changed, either in form or habit. A. asserts that the woman was physiologically so changed as to render her condition in gestation and parturition more painful and perilous. B. denies and asserts that there was no physiological change or change of any kind (in this regard) except what sin and moral depravity are capable of producing upon womanly functions by unhygienic habits in the deliberation of the vital functions and constitutional debility. Sin withers and abnormalizes whatever it touches, and pours its virus along the veins of humanity through the successive generations. A. asserts that the woman was, by a divine fiat, put under an abnormal subjection to her husband. B. denies, and alleges that woman was created in a state of subjection to her husband, and that all the abnormalness of that subjection after the fall was the natural result, not the supernatural, of moral corruption and its consequent ignorance, unkindness, injustice and brutality. A. asserts that the ground was so changed as to lose in part its former fertility, and its flora literally changed so that profitable fruit bearing trees and shrubs were actually destroyed and noxious trees and plants caused to grow in their stead, for the purpose of rendering man's toils more arduous, and his subsistence more precarious. B. denies,

and alleges that the course of the physical world was not supernaturally changed, that the earth was cursed, not physically but only in relation to man, in such a way that what was in itself good, might by the corruptness and perversness of the human heart be made the occasion of evils, just as are these blessings of the divine Father by human wickedness converted into curses. B. also asserts that thorns and thistles grew before as well as after the fall, and these terms in the text may be taken in a symbolical sense, as representative of all these things, harmless in themselves, which men may make the occasion of trouble. They grow along every path, beset every vocation, and are incident to every station of life. But they may be in a large measure avoided or overcome; or by God's goodness even turned to good account. A. asserts that man's state of labor is abnormal, subsequent to the fall, and that it was supernaturally and judicially imposed as a punishment for sin. B. denies, and alleges that a state of labor is man's normal condition, whether sinful or innocent, and that all abnormality in his sinful state is the natural result of his own abnormality. A. asserts that because of Adam's sin the creator turns away from man, and in wrath denounces upon him the curse, and by the curse brought upon him, the total corruption of his moral nature, and all other evils physical and moral, thus making the sin the occasion of the curse, and the curse causative of all evil. B. denies, and asserts that Adam's own voluntary sin was causative of his corruption of nature and of his

changed ethical relation to the physical world, that the so-called curse did not in any sense change for the worse his condition, for the whole curse was in his sin and his consequent depravity, both of which transpired before the utterance of the curse; that the so-called curse was consequently rather a revelation than the origination of the curse and also a gracious revelation unfolded to Adam, even more fully than his consciousness had already done, the enormity of his guilt, and also what his future trouble should be on account of his sins, thus forewarning him against other sins. A. asserts, or seems to assume, that God was in some way taken by surprise at Adam's sin, and in wrath denounced curses upon him, and turned away from him, or withdrew from him his great love. B. objects to this and alleges that God knew the end from the beginning, and was fully prepared for the event, that man, instead of ceasing to be an object of the creator's solicitude and care, was if possible an object of deeper anxiety after the fall than before it, on the principle that there is more joy among the angels over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety and nine that need no repentance, and for the reason that the good shepherd leaves the ninety and nine and goes to the mountain in search of the one stray sheep. The divine heart is affected by the sad ruin that sin has wrought very much as the heart of a wise governor and father would be by the condition of a self-ruined child. As a governor he administers the law, as a father he must and does deeply pity his sin. As a con-

clusive evidence that the creator did not turn away from the sinner, or that his hitherto overflowing complacency is now turned to overflowing love of commiseration, we find that in his announcement to the serpent and before he had revealed to Adam the consequences of sin, he actually announced a "Savior"—a deliverer. "The seed of woman shall bruise thy head."

I have now given you briefly the fundamental characteristics of the two theories of the so-called Adamic curse, the objective and the subjective. The former has the sanction of orthodoxy so-called. The latter, in my judgment, has the support of philosophy and the logic of Bible facts. You can choose for yourselves.

CHAPTER VII.

THE RELATION OF SIN TO NATURAL AND PHYSICAL EVIL.

(Continued.)

IN order to reach a clear and satisfactory explanation of Gen. iii. 22-24, we must first exclude the ideas of physical life and physical death. The text, I think, is to be regarded as both literal and symbolical.

1. The garden was literally the place and symbolically the state of happy communion with God.

2. The tree of knowledge of good and evil was literally a tree, but symbolical of the consequences of disobedience, i.e., alienation from God, or spiritual death.

3. The tree of life was literally a tree, and also symbolical of the consequences of disobedience, i.e., spiritual life, or happy fellowship with God—not the source of either physical or spiritual life.

4. The expulsion from the garden was literal, and also symbolical of loss of fellowship with God, i.e., spiritual death.

5. The cherubim and the flaming sword were possibly literal, but probably only symbolical of divine providence, preventing access to the tree of life.

With this presentation of the subject, everything in the text can, I think, be satisfactorily harmonized, and the difficulties which beset all adverse theories successfully obviated.

I will make my explanations as brief as compatible with clearness.

1. "The man is become as one of us to know good and evil."

These words may be, and I think generally are, taken as ironical. The serpent had said to Eve, "Ye shall be as Gods knowing good and evil." Chap. iii. 4.

Many expositors think that God repeats these words of the serpent ironically.

We know that the Bible does sometimes use irony. Christ himself ironically repeats the language of the man to whom one talent had been given. "Thou knowest that I reap where I sowed not and gather where I have not strowed."

If these words, "The man has become as one of us to know good and evil," had been spoken to Adam himself, and had God made the allegation the ground of his expulsion, we might very reasonably consider them to be used ironically. But to use irony of a person and then proceed to make the allegation the ground or reason of an important action is not very consistent, because it assumes that the action is without reason.

I therefore think that the words were not intended as irony, but as expressing a real historic fact. If this is so then the words, "The man has become one of us to know good and evil," mean, I sup-

pose, that Adam had come to know good and evil experimentally, or had experienced good and evil in contrast. Hence what God knew intuitively, perhaps Adam knew in a bitter experience.

2. "Lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life and eat and live forever."

This language fairly implies that Adam, if permitted to remain in the garden, and to have access to the tree of life and to eat of its fruit, would, in some sense, live forever. To prevent his living forever seems to be the reason for his expulsion from the garden and for the employment of the cherubim and the flaming sword.

The difficulty of the explanation arises out of the words "live forever."

In what sense would he live forever if permitted to eat of this tree? This is the vital question.

1. If these words refer to true spiritual life—a happy fellowship with God—to have free access to this tree of life was the very thing Adam most needed, and also the very thing that God, if he desired his happiness, would be quite willing to give. But as God did not give him access we must seek some other meaning for those words, "live forever."

2. If we say these words refer to physical life, as is generally done, then we render any satisfactory explanation impossible.

(1) Because we assume that Adam could, by eating of this fruit, set aside God's purpose as to his mortality and make himself immortal.

(2) As we assume that this tree had in itself a

power stronger than God, and that to prevent him from becoming, contrary to God's will, physically immortal, he must be expelled from the garden.

(3) This physical life hypothesis assumes that God had power to put Adam out of the garden and keep him out, but not power to prevent him, if he remained in the garden, from eating of this tree and from being physically immortal.

All these glaring incongruities grow necessarily out of the assumption that natural death in Gen., chap. ii. 17, and natural life in chap. iii. 22, are respectively intended.

In opposition to this hypothesis I suggest that the words "live forever" refer not to real spiritual life, not to physical life in any form, but to symbolical life, a life not real, but purely ideal or nominal.

Let us test this hypothesis by the facts.

1. It was not the mere eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, but this intention, the disobedience in the intention to eat that produced death. The act of eating was the evidence of the intention. Hence we may consider the tree itself as the symbol of death. In like manner the tree of life was not the source of real life, but only the symbol of life. If this is true, then the words "live forever" cannot mean anything more or different from symbolic life. For illustration, if baptism is a symbol of regeneration, then of course the administration of it can give only symbolic, not real, regeneration.

2. But do the sacred writers recognize this sym-

bolic or nominal life? Certainly. "I know thy works, that thou hast a name that thou livest, and art dead." Rev. iii. 1.

In the apostles' day all that believed in Christ had spiritual life, and all that professed to believe had nominally the same. All that were baptized were called saints or holy ones, but all such were not really so, as Simon Magus. Such had nominal, but not real, spiritual life. If Adam had been permitted access to the tree of life he would have been nominally alive but really spiritually dead.

3. Adam was already mortal, either by creation, or by the decree of God for his disobedience. The fruit of the tree of life could not convert his mortality into immortality.

4. Adam was already spiritually dead—alienated from God—dead in sin, and this tree of life could not restore to spiritual life.

The hypothesis seems to harmonize all the facts, and is, as far as I can see, the only one that can harmonize them. If this is so, it is of necessity the true one.

If this is the proper explanation of the text, it was not a curse to be expelled from the garden, but a blessing; for it is a great calamity to have the nominal without the real spiritual life—the form without the power of godliness. Because we know that none are so hard to save as those who assume to be already saved.

I will now return to the subject in hand. Is physical death a part of the penalty of Adam's sin? I have examined the evidence relied upon in sup-

port of the affirmative of this proposition. This proof is supposed to be conclusive from several expressions used in the so-called Adamic curse, as "all the days of thy life," "till thou returnest unto the ground, for dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return." Now it seems to me that every one of these expressions, when carefully analyzed, instead of teaching that man was created immortal, as to his body, do teach by inevitable implication the very reverse.

1. "In sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life" imply that both sorrow and life should have an end. The sorrow, in one aspect of it, was confessed to be a consequence of sin. But if death was also a penal consequence (of sin), then one penal consequence is removed by another penal consequence. Capital punishment is sometimes commuted into imprisonment for life. In this case the imprisonment is accepted as the equivalent of death. The imprisonment is penal; the death is not penal, but the limitation or removal of the penalty. If both the imprisonment and the death were penal, a double penalty would be exacted. Hence I conclude this language, "all the days of thy life," was an event incident to man from his creation. This is further evident from the fact that exactly the same words are used to the serpent, "dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life." Hence it inevitably follows that if Adam's death was penal, then that of the serpent was also penal, and if that of the serpent, then of all other animals. But it was previously shown that some

animals were created to live by the death of others, and that death, if there is any truth in geology, reigned over the animal world thousands of years before the fall of man. These facts seem to be irreconcilable with the penalty of Adam's natural death.

2. The words "till thou return unto the ground, for out of it thou wast taken," teach the same truth. The reason given for returning to the ground is that he was taken out of it, and not because he had sinned.

3. "For dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return." Here we have the fact of mortality stated, and the reason of it given. Dust thou art, therefore unto dust shalt thou return. Chemically considered, the body of man is literally dust, and this was certainly as true before the fall as after it. Some commentators allow that all these forms of expression do imply liability to death at the time these words were spoken, which was after the fall, but insist that they refer to the death threatened in the prohibition. My first remark is that this is a cool *petitio principii*, a sheer begging of the question, and of course is useless as an argument.

My second remark is, if the death implied in these texts refers to the death named in the prohibition, then the serpent's death must, by logical necessity, be referred to the same cause, which we have seen is supremely preposterous.

Romans v. 12, 21 ("Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof," "What fruit had ye then in those

things whereof ye are now ashamed? for the end of those things is death"), is generally assumed to teach that all physical suffering and death are proper punishments of sin in the subject.

The text is certainly very difficult of a satisfactory exegesis. Hence there is almost an endless diversity of opinion among exegetes and theologians in regard to it.

At present I shall attempt nothing except to ascertain what bearing it may have on the subject in hand. It is very clear that death, in some sense, is in some way connected with the first sin and the first man—the first sin rather than subsequent sins—because the first sin instantly produced the death even before a record was possible. But the point in question is, what death is here intended? Dr. Shedd says it is death temporal, spiritual, and eternal. Dr. Hodge says death is here taken in the sense of penalty for sin, and assuming physical death to be penal, it of course was included.

We must not forget that assumption is not proof. If physical death is included we ought to be able to find some clear indication of it in this text or elsewhere. I do not find any proof here or elsewhere. On the contrary I find some strong presumption against it.

1. The context has not a word to say about physical death, except in relation to Christ. The subject under discussion is the mediatorial work of Christ, and the benefit believers receive through his mediation. As deliverance from physical death is not one of these benefits its introduction into the

discussion would seem to be illogical and supererogatory.

2. "Death" is confessed to be an ambiguous word. It is generally admitted that spiritual death is included in this death. But I protest against the vice of taking an ambiguous word in any given proposition, in two or more of its specific meanings, unless there is something in the connection to require it. There is nothing in the connection to require it, and the common rule of interpretation excludes the idea that more than one kind of death is intended. Dr. Hodge evidently felt the force of this fact, and to avoid the difficulty insisted that in this connection death means "penalty"—an easy method of solving a difficulty—if one word cannot cover the ground take another that can. This change of words, however, only relieves him from the absurdity of using a word in a double sense. It by no means proves what he assumes to be true, viz., that physical death is any part of the punishment of sin. Any hypothesis that requires such a use of words to support it is presumptively false.

3. Paul was certainly consistent with himself, and if he used the word death in a complex sense in this text in one case, he is presumed to so use it in all. If he used it in a specific sense in one instance he did so in all. He uses the word death or its equivalent six times. Now, if the reader will read the whole text, putting the adjective *spiritual* before the word death, he will find everything in harmony, and withal perfectly perspicuous, and in full accord with everything in the Bible.

The hypothesis that spiritual death only is meant explains all the facts, and is therefore presumably true. On the contrary, pursuing the same course, and supplying the adjective, *physical*, before the word "death" we find no particular trouble until we come to the fifteenth verse. "Many be (physically) dead," or in a state of physical death. The word "many" is a synonym of the word "all" in verse 12. If you read, "For, if through the offense of one all be (physically) dead, or in a state of physical death," you make the hypothesis contradict the facts. It therefore cannot be true. But no other hypotheses are possible in the case. The hypothesis of spiritual death only explains all the facts, the other cannot explain them. Then the former must be true.

4. We have several pairs of antithesis in this text, among them "condemnation" and "justification." The judgment was by one to condemnation, but the free gift is of many offenses unto justification. Condemnation is preparative to punishment, as justification is preparative to enjoyment. Condemnation in this case is unto death, say spiritual and physical, and the justification is unto life, or of life. Now we must, from logical necessity, make these antithetical terms equally comprehensive, else they are not antithetical at all. If we take condemnation to be unto spiritual death, then we must take justification to be unto spiritual life. But if we take condemnation to be unto both natural and spiritual death, then of course the justification must be unto both natural and spiritual life. Therefore

if sin subjects us to both natural and physical death, then justification through Christ ought to exempt us from both natural and spiritual death. But we know justification does not exempt from natural death.

It is, therefore, a logical necessity that condemnation does not subject us to natural death. This is absolutely conclusive.

This same conclusion flows out of the inherent force of other antithetical terms, used in the text—out of the words “death” and “life.” If we make the term death include both natural and spiritual death, we must make the term life include both natural and spiritual life. This again brings the theory in conflict with the facts, for those that believe have spiritual and eternal life, still they have to die physically. Or if we accept Dr. Hodge’s idea, and say that death is put for the whole penalty of sin, and substitute the word *reward* as its appropriate antithesis, nothing is gained; because if we have put natural death in the penalty we must put natural life in the reward. But we know it is not there, or if natural death is in the penalty, the apostle had to pay it, for Christ never paid it for him; or if he did, the penalty was twice paid, or the divine administration has received more than its due, or else Paul’s own death supplemented the atoning work of Christ. It seems to me to be imperative upon us to admit all these absurdities, or reject the idea that human suffering is strictly the punishment of sin.

1 Cor. xv. 21, 22: “For since by man came death by man came also the resurrection of the dead.

For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.' In the common theory this text is assumed to furnish conclusive evidence that natural death is a penal consequence of Adam's sin. I readily grant that if we assume this death to be penal then the text admits a very easy solution. But we should remember that the very point to be *proved* is that this death is penal, and it is not to be assumed. It is evident that with a little supplementing the text may be made to teach that doctrine. For if we read, "Since by man's sin came death," then the liability to death would sustain to sin the relation of sequent to antecedent. But we have injected into the text a very important element, which is capable of changing the whole aspect of the question. But the text, as it stands without supplementing, does not necessarily nor probably teach the penalty of natural death. All that the text clearly and unmistakably does teach is that by man or through (dia) man came, or is, death, and by man or through (dia) man, came, or is, the resurrection, and as in Adam all die, or are dying, so in Christ shall all be made alive. But how death came through Adam, the text does not so clearly teach. But from necessity it comes through him in some way, involving us in its consequences, as does human depravity, or else it comes to us by virtue of natural relationships, as does natural life, or as life and death both come to the animal world, from natural relationship to their progenitors. The last position, I take it, is the true one, for the following reasons:

1. From the structure of the text itself man in both members of the antithesis is represented, not in a casual or active relation, but in a passive relation to the words death and resurrection. Man is not active, not the agent, but the medium through which death comes, as the same man is the medium through whom natural life comes to all. This is the natural force of the language employed. This conclusion is very much strengthened, if not positively confirmed, by the known facts in relation to the second member of the antithesis. By man the humanity of Christ came, also the resurrection. Now, was Christ as man the cause, the author, the agent of the resurrection? So far from this, he was actually the first fruits of it, the first subject of it, the first man raised from the dead. He was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, the resurrection came by an agent, a power outside of his humanity; and just because he was the first fruits of it, and in his human nature related to all mankind, the resurrection comes to all men. This is exactly the sense in which the resurrection came by or through him to all men. This throws a flood of light upon the first member of the antithesis. Adam was not the cause, or the author, or the agent that brought natural death into the world, but the medium through which death comes to all, just as through him life comes to all. The source both of life and death was outside of himself, and just as the humanity was the subject of the resurrection, and not the author, but the medium of it to all other men. So Adam was not the author of

death, but the subject, and being the first of his kind is the medium of it to all other men. If this reasoning be true, then natural death is not the penalty of Adam's sin.

2. The 22d verse, torture it as we may, cannot by exegesis, or logic, or anything else, be made to teach a contrary doctrine. "As in Adam all die so in Christ shall all be made alive." The preposition "in" denotes intimate relationship. The idea is by virtue of this close relationship between "all" and "Adam," all die, just as by this relationship all live or receive life in or through him. By a similar relationship between the same *all* and Christ all shall be made alive, raised to life. As Christ's human life is not the author of the resurrection life, so Adam is not the author of natural death. Christ being the first fruits of the resurrection life is the pledge and prelude of the universal resurrection. So Adam being the first mortal man is the pledge and prelude of universal human death.

3. This view of the subject is very much favored by a comparison of this text (1 Cor. xv. 21, 22) with Romans v. 12-19.

In the latter the first and second Adam are contrasted as to their respective influence upon the destiny of mankind in relation to moral and spiritual things. The former brings sin, spiritual death, and condemnation; the latter brings righteousness and spiritual life. Adam's activity is expressed by the words "transgression," "offense," "sinned." These words all denote personal and voluntary activity. The activity of Christ is implied in the

whole mediatorial work by which he set aside the consequences of the spiritual death and condemnation. Both, by their voluntary activity, exert a powerful influence upon mankind. One is the source of spiritual death, the other is the source of spiritual life. But in 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, the first and second Adam are contrasted in relation to physical death and the resurrection. Here both are profoundly passive, are far from being authors or agents. They are the non-active mediums respectively, of the power of death and the power of the resurrection. If Adam's personal and voluntary activity brought into the world physical death, as it confessedly did spiritual death, why is not the important fact expressed, or at least implied, in this long discussion of natural death and the resurrection?

In Romans this authorship is repeated over and over. But in Paul's long argument on the resurrection, in which the words "dead" and "death" are used about twenty-three times, all referring to natural death, it is never once said, nor is it obscurely implied, that he had any active participation in the introduction of this physical death into the world. Is not this a most remarkable fact, if death physical and death spiritual and death eternal are the penalty of the Adamic sin? The most rational explanation of this remarkable silence is that Paul did not feel himself called upon to explain what did not exist.

Romans viii. 10: "And if Christ be in you, the body (*soma*) is dead, (*nekron*) because of sin

(*di' amartian*); but the spirit is ~~live~~ because of righteousness." The meaning of the words, "the body is dead because of sin," is in doubt.

Two explanations are proposed:

1. "The body indeed is dead, i. e., must die, is obnoxious to death." (Hodge *in loco*.)

2. The body of those in whom Christ dwells is dead, or inactive as to, or in reference to, sin in a sense analagous to that in which the unregenerate soul is dead to righteousness. Authorities differ, some advocating the first and some the second explanation. The subsequent context of chap. viii. seems to favor the first explanation. The preceding context seems to favor the second. The arguments in favor of the first are substantially as follows:

(a) That the word "body" very rarely, if ever, has the sense of the word "flesh" as used in the context, and therefore does not favor the idea that the word "dead" means non-activity, or the non-enjoyment as to sin; it must, therefore, refer to natural death.

(b) That the 11th verse refers to the resurrection of the mortal bodies, and that fact requires us to believe that the 10th verse refers to natural death. This explanation is plausible and in strict harmony with the theory of the causative relation of sin and natural death. But the argument is not satisfactory.

1. It takes undue liberty with the word "dead." "The body is dead" means the body must die, is obnoxious to death. We have just as much exe-

getical authority to say that the words, "the spirit is life," in the next member of the sentence, means the spirit must become life, is obnoxious to life. This would make the entire proposition unintelligible. Paul, in this verse, speaks of what exists now, and not of what will be hereafter. We understand that there is a material difference between a dead body and a body that is only obnoxious to death, the difference being just that of the living and the dead. Do the sacred writers predicate death, either physical or spiritual, of any that are not dead? I think not. This, then, is a liberty taken with the word "death" not according to usage or any other authority known to me.

2. The argument receives almost its whole force from a misapprehension of the relation existing between the words "flesh" and "body." Dr. Hodge urges that to use the words as equivalents is contrary to usage, and that the word "body," in the sense of flesh, never has the word "dead" joined with it. Now, it is certainly true, if the doctrine of realism is not true, that the abstract and the concrete are not equivalents, and that the word "dead" is never united with an abstract word, nor with any concrete word, used as its equivalents, for the simple reason that the abstract has no existence independent of the concrete. Hence we should be very careful not to join the word "dead" with nonentity. The body and flesh are often used as synonyms in the New Testament, notably in reference to the Lord's Supper, and in reference to his body in the tomb. In such cases the word flesh is taken

in the concrete sense, just as is the body. But in the context, verses 4-9, Paul uses the word in the sense of sensuality, or, as Dr. Hodge expresses it, "corrupt nature." But the terms are both pure abstracts, and have no existence except in the concrete. It is the inheritance of all human beings, and exists only in the concrete. It can be destroyed only in the concrete, or in the mind and body.

In order to complete salvation according to Paul's conception, four things are necessary :

1. The death of the human spirit as to sin.
2. The new life of the spirit as to righteousness.
3. The death of the body as to sin.
4. The quickening of the mortal body by the spirit that raised up Christ from the dead.

The first is implied by the second, because there can be no life as to righteousness without death as to sin.

The second and third are expressed in the text. The fourth is fully brought out in verse 13. The first three are conditional upon union with Christ. "If Christ be in you," these follow as results of that indwelling, and are consequently true of all believers. The fourth, or the quickening of the mortal body, is not accomplished till the resurrection, when the complex salvation of the body and mind is secured. This is the Pauline method of the process from death to life. It meets fully the demands of the preceding and the succeeding contexts, and fully harmonizes with the general teachings of the apostles. If further evidence be required to prove that Paul, when he says the body

is dead (*di' amartian*), does not refer to human mortality, but to death as to sin, we have it abundantly in the fact that this death is in consequence of vital spiritual union with Christ. "If Christ be in you the body is dead." Now, it is gratuitous to say that natural death, or mortality, is in any sense conditioned upon union with Christ, or in any manner a consequence of it. If this were true, then none but those in whom Christ dwells could ever experience natural death. But all die physically, whether Christ dwells in them or not. But only those in whom Christ dwells are dead because of sin (*di' armartian*), therefore this is not physical death.

Other grave objections might be presented to the mortality theory with the same effect, but enough has been said to show that Rom. viii. 10 does not teach, and cannot be so tortured as to be made to teach, that human mortality is a penal consequence of sin.

I have now briefly noted the principal text relied upon to prove the penalty of physical death and all physical sufferings. I confess myself utterly surprised at the shallowness of the authority upon which the theory rests. If I have not deceived myself, the very texts relied upon for proof of the doctrine, when carefully considered, actually disprove it. I therefore might have declined further discussion. But as you probably wish to know what more could be said in favor of the negation of the question I will, in a succeeding chapter, briefly refer to a number of other facts.

CHAPTER VIII.

SIN, TRANSGRESSION AND INIQUITY.

ARE physical death and all human sufferings the the penal consequences of Adam's sin? I deem the following facts irreconcilable with the affirmative:

1. Supposing the rates of increase in the human family had not sin been introduced, to have been equal to what it really has been, the population of the globe would have been already one hundred times greater than it now is, and in process of innumerable years would have constituted a bulk of living humanity a thousand times greater than the globe itself. Such is the legitimate consequence of the theory.

Augustine, who did more than any other man to fasten the absurd theory upon the church, seemed to apprehend some trouble on this score, and suggested that possibly at a suitable time sinless human bodies might be spiritualized, and then removed out of the way of their successors.

Others, too, in contemplating the difficulty resulting from this theory, have sought relief in the same way. They do not tell us, however, as far as I have seen, how the spiritualization is to relieve the difficulty, whether by diminishing human bodies to infinitesimal points, or by transforming them into essentially spiritual entities, and then

constitute them the occupants of a super-sensible and super-sensual sphere of being. If the former is the idea, it is proper to remark that it does not obviate, but only a little obscures, the difficulty. For with any ratio of increase, however small the bodies might be, in the course of an infinity of years, the same startling results would be reached, as indicated above. This latter idea, i. e., transformation into spiritual entities, as in the resurrection, would, I suppose, meet with more general favor. Now, what astonishes me above measure is that Augustine, as well as his retailers, did not perceive that his mode of obviating the difficulty was an abandonment of his theory itself, or, which is the same thing, two propositions are affirmed that are mutually self-destructive, i. e., that an animal body was created immortal, but it became immortal only by spiritualization.

What is mortal is necessarily mutable in its mode of being; what is immortal is necessarily immutable in its mode of being. All organic beings are changeable, and therefore mortal. All inorganic entities are unchangeable in their mode of being, though material things may be changed in form. At least we know of no instance in the realm of nature or of mind of a departure from these fundamental truths, and such a departure is scarcely conceivable. The theory assumes that the allwise Creator made the human body immortal, and then, because man sinned, by a fiat, made it mortal.

God, in the domain of matter and mind, works up, not down. He does not begin with the im-

mortal and work to the mortal. He takes no backward steps. Onward and upward is the line of movement. Moral degradation is possible, as the world's history sadly proves. But degradation from one mode of existence to another, as from immortality to mortality, is incredible. Nature, speaking through her multitudinous throats, utters an imperative protest. The intuitions of reason reject it, and God's word, I venture to say, never authorized it. Augustine and others asserted it, and bolstered the figment with a few misapplied texts, and the world blindly assented. If it should be replied that there was no degrading fiat transmuting the immortal into the mortal, but the change was wrought by the natural operation of the laws that subordinate the physical to the moral, the animal to the intellectual; just as the soul by a state of sin passes from a state of spiritual life to a state of spiritual death; it is sufficient to reply that sin did not change the soul's mode of existence, but its moral qualities. Sin took away no old faculties, and added no new ones to the soul, which was as truly immortal subsequent to sin as before it.

But the theory in question assumes a change in the mode of existence—a change from the immortal to the mortal, and from one set of adaptations and accommodations to another set wholly different. It is admissible I suppose, for illustration, to refer to the fallen angels, Satan in particular, he being the first and greatest of sinners.

He, as all the angels, is supposed to have a spir-

itual body, as well as the saints, in the resurrection state. Did his sin make his body mortal? But if Adam's sin made his body mortal, why did not Satan's sin make his body mortal? Will it be said Satan's body was spiritual while Adam's was animal, and that this is the cause of the difference? Partly right and partly wrong. Satan's body was spiritual, and therefore immortal. But Adam's body was animal, and therefore mortal. An immortal animal! Omnivorous in kind by creation, and living on vegetables and fruits and the flesh of other animals, liable to hunger, heat and cold, and sleeping when occasion required, and yet immortal? Marvelous indeed. These are not the characteristics of immortality. Immortal creatures do not subsist on such crude material, are not affected by the necessities of a fickle climate, do not grow weary, never sleep as Adam did before he sinned, or if they do heaven is not what we are expecting. An immortal animal is a contradiction in terms, mortality was a concreation with the first man. All the facts seem to show that the idea of a possible immortality conditioned upon obedience is a worthless foundation. Obedience expends itself upon the spiritual and can affect the physical only slightly, and not in such a way as to metamorphose the mortal into the immortal, the animal body into a spiritual body. But it may be pertinently inquired: If Adam had not sinned, would not his body at a suitable time been either spiritualized or superseded by a spiritual or resurrection body without the intervention of death, as seems to have been the case

with Elijah and Enoch? I reply, it is highly probable, but for sin Adam's body would have been spiritualized and fitted for all the felicities of a higher life as we suppose were the bodies of Elijah and Enoch. But in that case the immortality would have come, not from the original creation, but from spiritualization just as the immortality of Christ's body, who was as sinless as ever Adam was, resulted not from his sinlessness but from its quickenings or spiritualization. This is the point to be essentially noted, that the immortality comes neither from the creation nor from the sinlessness, but from the spiritualization. We know little about these translations and need not speculate much concerning them. They were evidently equivalent in effect to death and the resurrection. That is, death in the sense of deprivation of an animal nature, and resurrection in the sense of spiritualization, or the impartation of a new body. We can conceive of these two distinct events as synchronal, as they evidently were in the case of Enoch and Elijah, or as separated by a greater or less interval of time, as in the case of Christ, and possibly in the case of mankind generally. But in all cases bodily immortality comes neither from creation or sinlessness, but from supernatural spiritualization.

2. "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption."—1 Cor. xv. 50. The context clearly shows that the kingdom of God here means the church in the resurrection state. The text alleges that flesh and blood cannot inherit

this kingdom, cannot enter it—must of necessity be excluded from it. But the body of Adam was as truly flesh and blood, a natural or animal or corruptible, and therefore a mortal, body before the fall as it was afterwards, or as ours are now. Hence it is plain that his sin did not make his body natural, or as the word implies, animal, did not change it from an immortal to a mortal body. His sin did not bring natural death into the world as a punishment for sin.

3. "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us."—Gal. iii. 13.

If natural death is the curse of the law, or any part of it, then Christ hath not redeemed us from the curse of the law, or at least not from the whole curse, for believers are not exempt from natural death. It hence follows that Christ suffered a part of the curse and every believer a part. This flatly contradicts the text.

"He was made sin (a sin offering) for us."—2 Cor. v. 21. If natural death is a penal consequence of sin, then Christ, as a sin offering, does not take away the penal consequence of sin, even in those who are united to him by faith.

4. "Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to everyone that believeth." The doctrine of this text is that Christ saves the believer from the penal consequences of sin, but he does not save them from physical death.

5. That natural death is not the penalty of Adam's sin, or of any other sin, is both proved and exemplified in the person of Christ. The first and

second Adam were equally men. Adam's concreated holiness, if we choose to call uprightness holiness, was only negative. Christ was not only innocent but properly and actively holy. He therefore, according to the theory, ought to have had a stronger guaranty against physical death than had Adam. Yet he, in his sinless state, was mortal. He actually died. Will it be said Christ died for the sins of others? I reply, this is true ; (but the sins of others were not the cause of his mortality, but the occasion of his death.) This is evident from the fact that if he had not been mortal he could not have died on any account. To say it is possible for any immortal being to die is a contradiction in terms. I see no method of bending these stern facts into harmony with the penal theory of death.

Christ, the only sinless human being that ever drew breath, since the fall of man, was created mortal like all other men, and yet we are required to believe that mortality is a penal curse of Adam's sin !

6. The penal theory of natural death is irreconcilable with the doctrine of the resurrection. The resurrection gives to men, in lieu of their natural, corrupt, dishonored bodies, spiritual, incorruptible and glorious bodies, in every respect like unto Christ's glorious body. This exchange of the worse for the better does not agree with our notion of a penal curse, as the theory under consideration affirms death to be. Is it in fact a curse to take a man out of a worthless and dilapidated mud wall hovel and put him in a mansion ; to pull down

his rickety earthly tabernacle and give him a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens? This looks to me far more like benefaction than malefaction, more like blessing than cursing. I like the familiar sentiment,

Death is the gate to endless joy,
And dying is but going home.

7. The assumption that all human sufferings are the proper punishment of sin in the person of the sufferer, pretermits all distinction between physical and moral law, confounding things which are in themselves essentially distinct. All physical suffering results from the violation of physical laws. This violation may be the act of the sufferer, as in the case of imprudent eating, exposure, etc., or the suffering may be brought upon the person by the act of another, as in the case of murder, and other lesser injuries, or by the excesses of ancestors, as is often the case, or by ordinary providence, as in case of accidents and epidemics, or by judicial Providence, as in the destruction of Herod Antipas, or the Sodomites.

Moral evils, of course, result from the violation of moral law. The moral and the physical often overlap each other. All acts put forth in violation of physical law, for purposes of sinful pleasure, gratification or advantage, result in both moral and physical evil, as do all sorts of excesses and dissipation. In such cases it naturally follows that the individual, while enduring the penalty of violated physical law, also suffers the penal consequence of his violation of moral law, and consequently, while

writhing in physical pain, may at the same time feel the sting of penal fires in the domain of his moral being in the sense of moral degradation and shame, remorse, unmitigated guilt.

But notwithstanding this intimate relation between them, they are not blended or confounded, but remain separate and distinct.

The violations of moral law never bring physical retribution. Though the same act may be a violation of both laws. Unless we make the discrimination and hold it, we will be logically forced to assert conclusions as false as they are revolting. A very large per cent of the human family destroy their health, bring on suffering and death by imprudence or through ignorance.

Parents in like manner often destroy the health of their children, and the best of physicians that of their patients. Now, are we prepared to say in the light of such facts that all violations of physical law are of necessity violations of moral law, or are sins in the Bible sense of the word, which they must be if all possible human sufferings are punishments for sins? But of whose sins are all these sufferings the punishment? The theory says all suffering is a punishment of sin in the person of the sufferer. A man, though he may be one of the purest of earth, by a little imprudence may ruin his health, or he may lose his life by the hand of another, by an epidemic, by accident, or, like good old Simeon, he may pray to die, and God in answer may providentially call him away. The little infant, though it

never had a rational thought, often suffers a fearful death. In all such instances shall we say that the suffering is a punishment for violations of moral law? This shocks common sense and indicates the fallacy of the doctrine.

8. The theory in question contradicts all rational views of many facts stated in the Bible.

I do not see how it can be reconciled with the facts in the case of Job. God testified that there was none like him in the earth, a perfect and an upright man. One who feared God and avoided evil, yet he was more severely afflicted than any other man. Here we have the best man in the world, and yet the most afflicted man. But according to the theory, all these afflictions are the punishment of his sin. God's testimony makes him the best man, but the logic of the penal theory makes him the worst man. In fact, Job's comforters were strict penalists. They boldly defended the doctrine against which I protest. They could find no cause for Job's suffering but in his secret sins. Their philosophy was the so-called orthodox theory of the day. This, too, was Job's philosophy, but he could not reconcile the facts with his philosophy. He was conscious of innocency from the great sins of which his philosophy convicted him. Hence his utter embarrassment and confusion. His consciousness testified to his innocence, but his theory testified to his guilt, and between the two his afflictions were inexplicable. All the foolish things he said were provoked by his false philosophy; nor was he relieved from his troubles till the young

man Eliphas, demolished his false philosophy, and referred his troubles to the allwise but inscrutable providences of God.

This reference of all suffering to individual sins was also the philosophy of the pagan world. This fact finds a striking illustration in the conduct of the inhabitants of Miletus, when Paul was cast upon their coast and shipwrecked. They first thought him a good man, then because a viper fastened upon his hand they thought him a murderer escaping from justice, but overtaken by the fates; then, because he did not fall down dead, they thought he was a god. All this vacillation resulted from a struggle to harmonize facts with a false theory. The theory is absolutely refuted by the facts in the case of the rich man and Lazarus. In fact, it seems to be a part of the design, if not the chief purpose, of this scripture to demolish the false reasoning of men in regard to this absurd theory. Christ here teaches three important lessons:

(1) That a man may be eminently pious and yet be greatly afflicted in every sense. To such, death is a blessing instead of a curse.

(2) The man may be a great sinner and yet be blessed with all conceivable external good in this world.

✓ (3) That the moral government of God is not administered in this world according to the principles of exact retribution, but is disciplinary in its methods of administration. The case of the blind man found in the temple contradicts the doctrine under review. "Master, who did

sin, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?" This was the question asked by the disciples. Jesus replied, "Neither hath this man sinned or his parents, but that the work of God should be made manifest in him." (a) The disciples assumed that sin caused the blindness of this man. (b) Christ denied the assumption flatly and explicitly. (c) But he alleges that his blindness was providential, and for a sufficient reason. (d) Hence the affliction was not a punishment for his sin, but was purely administrative, not of the wrath but of the wisdom and goodness of God. ✓

Probably without this dispensation of providence this man never would have come to a saving knowledge of the truth, and the world would have been left without the benefit of this clue to thousands of similar providential occurrences. Many other similar facts might be stated, which seem to be adverse to the theory. I will consider in another chapter other aspects of the subject which favor the same conclusion.

CHAPTER IX.

PHYSICAL DEATH AND RESURRECTION NOT CONSEQUENCES OF SIN.—LIFE AND DEATH.

WHAT life is in itself we do not know. We can know only some of its characteristics.

Facts as apprehended by us authorize the affirmation that there is an infinite life which is the source of all creature life. All creature life is finite life, and is a product or derivation from infinite life. Infinite life is exclusively the property of God. It is unoriginated, underived, and interminable. Finite life is of two distinct kinds, spiritual and physical; but both have their source in infinite life. The expression, spiritual life, is ambiguous—may mean existence as a spiritual entity, and as such is imperishable or indestructible, partaking in this respect of the nature of infinite life, e. g., all spirits created in the image of God, whether good or bad, are immortal. But the words spiritual life, as used in the Scriptures, does not express the idea of mere existence or being, but rather denotes the state or quality of spiritual creatures. Bad spirits have everlasting life in the sense of persistent being, but are destitute of spiritual life in the sense of a state of fellowship with God.

2. We know little more of death than we do of life. We know, however, that it is the negation of

life, or is in some sense the destruction of life. All living material organisms, as plants and animals, seem to be destined to resolution into primitive and inorganic matter. It is not the primitive and constituent material that is destroyed, but only the organisms and their functions or offices. Such organisms undergo continual changes in the inconstituent elements. These are not the same for two consecutive moments. The process of decay or waste is ever going on, and unless this waste is more than compensated by the incorporation of new matter there can be no growth; and unless it is fully compensated there is actual decay. This decay or disintegration is death, incipient death we may call it, but real nevertheless, because it is the transmutation of living into dead and inorganic matter. Hence it is literally true that material organisms begin to die in this sense the moment they begin to live; and, of course, life abides only so long as the new supply compensates the loss, or the absolute suspension of the supply results in death, or the dissolution of the organism. But this necessary supply is dependent upon so many conditions, both external and internal to the organism, that life is in constant peril. An injury or impairment of a vital organ, as the lungs, the heart, the stomach, the kidneys, may render the organism incapable of appropriating the needed supply of nutriment, and death must follow; or the necessary food and air may be cut off by various causes, or the body may be so injured or mangled by violence from without as to produce death.

All supplies must come from without. The organism itself supplies nothing, originates nothing. Like devouring flames it does not furnish the material upon which it subsists, but only appropriates what is within its reach. If this external supply is cut off, or for any cause fails, death from starvation necessarily follows. But even when the organism is invaded by disease and the external materials necessary to its support, such as air, food and raiment, are abundant death sooner or later intervenes through sheer exhaustion of the vital organs. Plants, animals, and men, if not killed by other means, die of old age. This seems to be nature, or rather God's inexorable decree concerning all material organisms. To this there are no known exceptions, and none are believed to be possible. We might as reasonably assume the existence of material heavenly bodies exempt from the law of gravity as to assume the existence of material organized bodies exempt from the liability of decay and death. To say that man would have been an exception to the necessity of dying if he had not sinned is a violent assumption, not only without any proof, but in palpable conflict with all analogy and with every science that sheds any light on the subject, and in conflict with the Bible as well.

Another fact that has a vital bearing upon the question is that the life of all material organisms is capable of perpetuation only through the nutritious materials furnished by death. The flora of one period dies and furnishes plant food for the flora of succeeding periods. The same is true of the fauna.

All material life, vegetable and animal, subsists upon the material furnished by the death and decomposition of preceding organisms. Hence all material life and material death, in the present state of the world are mutually dependent. Without life there could be no death, and without death no perpetuation of life from one generation to another. This is true of all known organisms, unless man is the solitary exception. This admitted fact seems to authorize the conclusion that death is common to all material organic beings, and that it is not the accident or the product of human sin, but is an essential part of the divinely-ordained plan of the world. There is nothing in nature, reason, or revelation indicating that man is an exception to the universal reign of physical death.

Perhaps no man would have ever conceived the idea that physical death is a consequence of sin had not the sacred Scriptures associated sin and death, making sin the cause of death in some form. But we should remember that death in the sacred Scriptures is a very ambiguous word, having several different contradictory meanings, as physical death—a separation of soul and body, spiritual death—a separation of the soul from God, a death in sin and a death unto sin. The word death, in these uses of the term, means radically different states, states which are not dependent one upon the other. A man may be physically alive but spiritually dead, or both physically and spiritually alive, or physically dead and spiritually alive, or both physically and spiritually dead.

These well-known facts clearly show the necessity of cautious discrimination in fixing upon the sense in which the word is intended to be taken in any given text. Without discrimination we are liable to deceive ourselves and misinterpret the text in which the word occurs. It was exactly in this way, I believe, that Augustine deceived himself, and came to believe that not only physical death, but all suffering—all evil, physical and moral—are the penal consequences of sin.

It is a fact that all men are subject to physical death, also a fact that all are subject to spiritual death—are born in that state. The fact that both deaths are universal—both have the same victims—may seem to favor the idea that both have the same cause, viz., sin. But it would be an illicit inference to conclude that because physical and spiritual death are both universal, therefore both have the same cause. Reason is common to men, and so is a sinful nature common to all men, but these universal characteristics do not have the same cause. The first is natural to man; the second was not a concreation of the first man, but was to him an accident. So physical death is natural to man—he dies from a necessity inherent in his physical organism; but spiritual death is not a necessity inherent in the nature of spirit, but in the first man was a necessary result of a sinful volition and in all others is an hereditary state. The fact that both are universal is no proof that they result from the same cause: that is, from the first sin. The only authority claimed for the doctrine that physical death is a

punishment for the first human sin is a few texts of scripture, notably Gen. ii. 17 and Rom. v. 12. It is generally admitted that the word "death" in these texts includes spiritual death, and in order to make it include physical death it is necessary to give it a double meaning and make it in the same proposition express two wholly distinct and independent ideas. But this is an unpardonable abuse of terms which generates only darkness and confusion. Certainly the same word may be used in different propositions to express different ideas, but the same word is never used in a given proposition to express two distinct and antithetical ideas. If the word death in any text expresses spiritual death it cannot also express physical death; or if it expresses physical death then it cannot, at the same time, express spiritual death. We have just as much authority to say that in the text, John iii. 36, "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life," the word "life" has a double meaning and includes both spiritual and physical life, as to say the word death, or die, in Gen. ii. 17, or Rom. v. 12, means both spiritual and physical death. The cases are exactly parallel. But to so interpret John iii. 36 would be to array the Scriptures against themselves and contradict the universally known fact that the believers are no more exempt from physical death than are the unbelievers.

The most that can be fairly said in support of this physical death theory is that it is mere gratuitous inference from a few texts, an inference which puts the scriptures in irreconcilable conflict with

all the revealings of every science that bears on the subject. But more than this, and far worse than this, the doctrine is irreconcilable conflict with the plain teachings of many Bible texts, or with the logical implications of such texts. Conspicuous among these may be noted the following:

1. Ecc. iii. 19, 20: "For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts: even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast; for all is vanity. All go unto one place: all are of the dust and all turn to dust again."

This text is sufficiently plain, and its teachings easily understood. It teaches that man, as to his liability to death, is on exact equality with the beast or the animal world, or that death is just as natural to him as it is to beasts. The natural evils that befall one befall the other, as one dies so dies the other, both having one breath, and the man has in this respect "no pre-eminence above a beast." The reason assigned for this equal subjugation of both to death is the simple fact that both are literally dust, and hence must turn to dust again. It is, I think, not unsafe to say that no discriminating mind that has not a foregone conclusion to support could, in the face of this text; attribute the death of man and the death of the animal to wholly different and independent causes, or say that the death of the animal is due wholly to its physical organism and the death of man to Adam's sin.

Yet, those holding the theory that death is the

product of sin, actually do this most unreasonable thing.

This text, with any rational interpretation of its terms, requires us to believe that if sin is the cause of the death of the human body then it is also the cause of the death of the animals, for men have no pre-eminence in this respect above the beast, for all go to one place; all are of the dust, and all return to dust again.

Surely no truth needs to be more fully established by both science and revelation than that physical death is natural to man, just as it is to all physical organisms, and, of course, was a fundamental part of God's plan of creation and administration of the world. But in immediate association with this truth is another, namely, the resurrection of the dead, or the environment of the spirit in a spiritual body after death.

But the fact that man was created mortal as to his body or animal nature does not prove that his mind or spirit is mortal, or that it ever experiences death in the sense in which the body does. Many texts teach with more or less directness the spirit's survival of the death of the body. As we have just seen Ecc. iii. 19, 20 teaches most explicitly that physical death is alike common to man and to beast, and for the same causes. But the 21st verse teaches that at death the spirit of a man goeth upward and the spirit of the beast goeth downward to the earth. The two distinct doctrines of the mortality of the body and the immortality of the spirit are more briefly and explicitly taught in Ecc. xii.

7: "Then shall the dust (the deceased body) return to the earth as it was and the spirit to God who gave it." This is in exact accord with what God said to Adam in Eden, "Dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return." Heb. ix. 27: "It is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment." This teaches that death and judgment are co-ordinate events in the history of man, and one as truly a part of the original divine plan in relation to man as the other. It also teaches that the man, as to the mind or spirit, survives the death of the body; for if the spirit perishes with the body then after death there would be nothing to be subject to judgment.

I have referred to these texts (and might refer to many others), not merely to prove the immortality of the human spirit, but rather to indicate God's original plan or purpose concerning the nature and destiny of human kind. Two fundamental truths seem to me fully established by these scriptures:

1. That man was, as to his body, created mortal, and consequently with the necessity of physical death as inherent in his bodily nature.

2. That he was generated (not created), as to his spirit, immortal, in the image of God, and inherently incapable of dissolution in the sense in which the human body and all other material organisms die.

With these two facts satisfactorily fixed in mind I do not hesitate to advance another collateral proposition, viz., that the resurrection of the dead, or its equivalent, was a fundamental part of the

divine purpose or plan concerning all human beings; hence that death and the resurrection are not consequences of sin; or that men would have died and have risen from the dead as really without the introduction of sin into humanity as with its introduction. If this proposition is true it releases us from the painful and humiliating necessity of believing that human sin somehow took the allwise Creator on a surprise; that he had not seen the end from the beginning; that his original plan of administration was inadequate for the purposes for which he created the world, and that human sin put him under some sort of necessity of revising and materially changing his original plan of administration in order to adapt it to the unexpected exigencies arising out of human sin.

The word "death" in this connection is used in its close literal sense of the separation of soul and body, or the extinction of animal life, and without any reference to the accidents or attendant circumstances of death.

The fearfulness of death ordinarily arises chiefly from its accidents, rather than from the mere act of dying. Prominent among these accidents is sin, and the fear of the consequences of sin. Paul recognizes this fact when he says (1 Cor. xv. 56), "The sting of death is sin and the power of sin is the law." This text teaches, not that sin is causative of death, but that sin gives to death its sting. On the contrary, an assurance of victory over sin and the grave takes away, not death itself, but the *sting* of death.

The words "resurrection from the dead," or from a state of separation of soul and body, is used in the sense of the investment of the spirit, separated from the body of flesh and blood, with a spiritual body, "a building from God, a house not made with hands eternal in the heavens" (2 Cor. v. 1), "a body fashioned like unto Christ's glorious body" (Thes. iii. 2).

Resurrection in this sense is essentially different from the restoration to animal life of Lazarus and the son of the widow of Nain, and other like cases. In such cases there was only a temporary reunion of the spirit and the animal body. But in the resurrection proper the spirit is invested with a spiritual body, which is immortal, subject to no process of waste or decay, and has consequently no need of a compensating process of supply.

The spiritual and resurrection bodies of the redeemed are also free from all sensuous appetites and passions, and are in this respect like unto the angels (Luke xx. 34-38).

It is a noteworthy fact that the scriptures never expressly speak of the resurrection of the animal or material body. They, on the contrary, generally speak of "the resurrection of the dead" and "from the dead" and of the dead as arising. This fact is often overlooked in considering the doctrine of the resurrection. This scripture mode of presenting the subject of the resurrection suggests some grave difficulties concerning the mode of the resurrection, or as to what it really is, whether it is the reanimation, or revitalization and spiritualization of the

dead or devitalized animal body; or whether it is the investiture of the human spirit with a spiritual body wholly distinct from the dead body and independent of it; or whether the spiritual resurrection body is a divinely appointed product of the immortal spirit spontaneously seeking to reinvest itself with an environment suited to its changed condition, like the life principle of a naked grain of wheat seeking to envelop itself with a new environment or body. The first of these views seems—perhaps only seems—to be favored by the resurrection of Christ; the second seems—perhaps only seems—to be favored by the few first verses of 2 Cor. v., and the third seems—perhaps only seems—to be proved by 1 Cor. xv. 36–38. But it is no part of my purpose to discuss these extremely subtle and perplexing questions in this connection.

Our inability to reach satisfactory conclusions as to the manner of the resurrection is not even presumptive proof against the fact of the resurrection any more than our inability to understand the manner of creation is presumptive proof against the fact of creation.

The question as to the manner of the resurrection, however, is coming into more prominence than it has hitherto been, and in the future it may be expected to receive more attention than at present.

Further, it is coming to be a grave question whether the immortality of the soul itself does not depend upon the resurrection. Some of our good and great men hold that the soul's life, or at

least its activity, depends upon its vital union with the body. One of our recent and most popular commentaries (James, Fausett and Brown, 1 Cor. xv. 51-54) says: "Nowhere is the immortality of the soul distinct from the body taught; a notion which many erroneously have derived from heathen philosophers. Scripture does not contemplate the anomalous state brought about by death as the consummation to be earnestly looked for (2 Cor. v. 4), but the resurrection, 54. *Then*, not before. Death has yet a *sting*, even to the believers, in that his *body* is to be under its power till the resurrection. But then the sting and power of death shall cease forever." The above brief quotations involve a bundle of incongruities which no one can reconcile with themselves or with the scripture. But all these different questions aside, the question naturally enough arises, whether the resurrection is not an essential part of God's original plan concerning human beings. Many texts seem by necessary implication to authorize an affirmative answer. Note the following:

1. 1 Cor. xv. 50: "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God."

By the kingdom is here meant not the kingdom of grace, but the ultimate state of blessedness and glory, the final state of sainthood. To inherit is to receive or come into rightful possession and enjoyment of the kingdom. No one would say that sin gave to Adam his flesh and blood. All would admit that he was as truly flesh and blood before he sinned as he was afterwards. All too would admit that he

was created to inherit this kingdom of God. The inference, then, seems to be irresistible that God intended from the beginning that his physical and animal nature should undergo just such a change, as to his body, as is involved in the resurrection, a change from a natural to a spiritual body. This change from the natural to the spiritual body is exactly what the resurrection is intended to accomplish and what it did actually accomplish in the person of Christ, who is the first fruits, the first visible fruits of it.

2. 1 Cor. xv. 50: "Neither doth corruption inherit incorruption (*aphtharsian*)."

Corruption and incorruption are abstract terms equivalent to the concrete form. *What is in itself corrupt does not inherit or attain to what is incorrupt.* The text means, neither does the mortal inherit immortality (*aphtharsian*), for what is physically corrupt is necessarily mortal, and what is incorruptible is of course immortal. *Aphtharsian* (incorruption) is so translated in Rom. ii. 7 and 2 Tim. i. 10. Now there was never a day in Adam's history, either before or after his dejection, when his body was not undergoing change and this change is itself the product and proof of a corruptible and perishing body. Now as corruption cannot inherit incorruption or the mortal produce the immortal, we seem to be shut up to the necessity of believing that God from the beginning purposed to invest the human spirit with an incorruptible or spiritual body, freed from its sensuous nature, such as is assured to it in the resurrection.

3. 1 Cor. xv. 13 : "But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen."

These words are used by Paul as an argument against some parties who, it seems, admitted the resurrection of Christ, but denied the general resurrection. Paul's argument against this position is that if there is no general resurrection then Christ himself hath not been raised ; or that Christ's resurrection presupposes a general resurrection; that if there is no such resurrection then Christ himself has not been raised, just as the fact that one man dies presupposes that all other men are mortal, or must die, all having the same essential characteristics. Most commentators exactly reverse Paul's argument, and assert a causative relation between the resurrection of Christ and that of other men, or that the resurrection of Christ is causative of the general resurrection, or that the general resurrection is conditioned upon Christ's resurrection. But Paul, on the contrary, conditions Christ's resurrection on the fact of a general resurrection as a part of God's plan or purpose. This is evident from his language literally or naturally construed. "For if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen." Here the resurrection of Christ is conditioned upon the general resurrection as a fact in God's plan, just as the death of one man is conditioned upon the fact that in God's purpose all are destined to die, and as the death of one is the conclusive proof that all must die, so the resurrection of one (Christ) is proof that all shall rise. This is exactly Paul's argument against those

that admitted Christ's resurrection but denied a general resurrection.

So much importance did the Apostle attach to this argument that he repeats it in v. 16. "For if the dead rise not then is not Christ raised." Paul's argument makes Christ's resurrection a single instance, an exemplification and proof of a universal law of humanity which has its origin in the purpose of God. It is in no proper sense the cause of the general resurrection, but is strictly an exemplification and proof of a universal resurrection of the dead. That the resurrection of Christ is not causative of the general resurrection but a proof of it is put beyond all reasonable doubt by v. 20. "But now is Christ risen from the dead and become the first fruits of them that slept." The reference manifestly is to the earliest or first fruits of the harvest. The first fruit is the pledge, a sort of assurance of subsequent fruit. Now it is a self-evident truth that the first fruits of a harvest do not produce themselves; nor do they produce or cause or necessitate the harvest. They only give proof or assurance of a harvest. In like manner the resurrection of Christ, as the first fruits of them that sleep, does not cause or produce or condition or make necessary the general resurrection of the dead. It, on the contrary, gives proof of such a resurrection.

The existence of a fact and the revelation of a fact are different things. So the cause of an event and the proof of an event are different things, and must be distinguished, otherwise we shall be involved in inextricable confusion. Making

these pertinent distinctions we can, I think, pretty accurately apprehend the true relation of Christ's resurrection to the general resurrection, which may be fairly stated thus: Christ's resurrection did not cause or originate the existence of the resurrection as a factor of God's administration concerning human destiny but revealed or made known to us its existence as an essential factor in God's plan or administration. Again, Christ's resurrection is not the source or ground of the general resurrection but the proof and exemplification of it. Again, Christ's resurrection is neither the cause nor the condition of the general resurrection, but the proof of it. If this is a correct statement then it is clear enough that Christ's resurrection and the general resurrection are not related as cause and effect, nor as condition and consequent, as is often asserted, but as co-ordinate and nondependent events, both having their cause in the divine purpose or will, and that purpose, I think, was not an afterthought of God suggested by the sin of the first man, but God's original purpose coincident with his purpose to create man a rational animal. Death and the resurrection, I take it, are the divinely-appointed means through which God from the beginning purposed to exalt man to the highest heaven ; hence neither death nor the resurrection from the dead is conditioned upon the sin of the first man.

One of the most plausible arguments in support of the doctrine that physical death is the result of sin is founded on the assumption ; that the resur-

rection is chiefly, if not wholly, designed to set aside the effects of sin in relation to our physical nature. The argument assumes that the resurrection of Christ is causative of the general resurrection, which, as we have seen, is incapable of proof. We know with the utmost certainty that the death and resurrection of Christ do not set aside spiritual death, nor do they set aside physical death even of believers. It is true that the mission of Christ was to abolish death, both spiritual and temporal (Heb. ii. 14), but these things are accomplished not by his death or resurrection or both, but by his own life-giving power. He himself is the resurrection and the life. He abolishes spiritual death by the impartation of his own spiritual life, and temporal death by giving to the dead a body like unto his own glorious body. Christ's earthly ministry—his miracles, teachings, death, and resurrection—did not originate life and immortality, but brought them to light—revealed them to the world in a manner more striking and satisfactory than could have been done by any other method.

The resurrection does much more than restore life to the body or compensate for the loss of animal life. It gives a spiritual instead of a physical, an incorruptible instead of a corruptible, an immortal instead of a mortal body, a body like unto Christ's glorious body, free from all sensuous appetites and passions, incapable of all sensuous pains and pleasures, making them in all these respects equal unto the angels. It is not the whole truth, not scarcely any part of the truth, to say that re-

generation puts the human soul back into the state in which Adam was created. It does far more than this as will be elsewhere seen. So the resurrection of Christ does far more than restore the dead body or furnish an equivalent substitute for it. The body of Adam was subject to death, did actually die. But the resurrection body, Christ himself tells us, can die no more. "Neither can they die any more for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God being children of the resurrection." (Lu. xx. 36.) The fact that Adam's body was created capable of death shows irrefutably that it was not immortal, and that God from the beginning intended it to be superceded by a spiritual body, making it equal to the angels in this respect and liable to die no more. Such a change is just what the resurrection is intended to secure.

In the light of Bible facts it appears to me incontestably true that both physical death and the resurrection are intended in God's original plan or purpose concerning the ultimate destiny of humanity. If this is not true, then God, it seems, was somehow thwarted in his purpose and reduced to the necessity of changing his original plans for accomplishing his purpose in regard to human immortality. But this view attributes imperfection to God, finitizes his wisdom or power or both and must therefore be rejected. If these statements are grounded in facts—if both death and resurrection of the dead are integral parts of God's purpose or plan concerning humanity—then it is sun-clear that men did not become mortal by Adam's sin or

any other sin. Nor did sin originate the necessity of the resurrection.

Suppose the scriptures were dumb as to the source of physical death, then we could know nothing of its source except what we could gather from such sciences as biology, physiology, anatomy and geology. These sciences are founded upon established facts learned by observation and the necessary implications of these facts. Would the facts upon which these sciences rest ever even suggest that the human body was created immortal and became mortal by a sinful act or any other act possible to man? Certainly not. On the contrary, they are utterly irreconcilable with such a supposition and imperatively require us to believe that, as to his animal nature, man is as truly subject to death as the horse or any other animal. Nor is it necessary that we shall be adepts in these sciences in order to be able to see that men as really die from a necessity as do all other animals. The man of ordinary reasoning powers, however ignorant of technical science he may be, if he permit himself to reason upon the subject at all, cannot fail to see the unreasonableness of attributing the death of animals and plants to a necessity of nature and the death of men to the accident of sin.

CHAPTER X.

NECESSITATED VIRTUE; OR, HOLINESS AND PROBATION.

LET it be assumed that necessitated virtue or holiness, or necessitated vice or unholiness are impossible things, because virtue and vice are predicable only of free or unnecessitated acts. Judicial holiness as it is sometimes called is predicable of anything that is consecrated to God. Hence this kind of holiness is in the Bible often predicated of things rational and irrational, animate and inanimate.

But even this kind of holiness is never a concreation, but is produced only by a consecration to sacred uses. Holiness, in the sense of innocence or uprightness, is a possible concreation. Indeed, we cannot conceive it possible for a newly created mind, as Adam's was, to be created in any other state than that of uprightness or innocence; for it is self-evident that such a mind could have no more to do in determining its own mortal qualities than in determining its own being or any of its physical senses or functions.

Anything imparted to it in its creation would be either its felicity or calamity, and not its virtue or

vice, and would, of course, be neither rewardable nor punishable.

It has been the calamity of a large part of the theological world, from Augustine to this day, to mistake this concreated innocence for true holiness or such holiness as meets the requirements of the divine law and gives fitness for eternal life; or such holiness as is the sequence of loving God with all the heart. The orthodox confessions generally say that God imbued man with righteousness and true holiness, and the proof text chiefly relied upon in support of this idea is Gen. i. 26, "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." The proposed proof seems wholly irrelevant.

The image and likeness of God as here used, from the nature of the case, can include only the psychological likeness of the Creator, and consequently the possibility of positive or true holiness, and not true holiness itself. Intelligence, sensibility and will, or freedom, furnish the basis and the only possible basis of a moral character. Without these prerequisites, it is inconceivable how the Deity himself or any of his creatures could possess any moral attributes, or any moral character. On the contrary, the combination of these qualities in any one creature constitutes that creature a moral agent, and as such capable of moral action. Both righteousness and holiness presuppose a law or standard of righteousness or holiness. But moral rightness or holiness consists in right or obedient action from the right motive. The correctness of this proposition, I suppose, will not be denied.

But as it is plainly impossible for the mind to act before it is created, and as holiness consists in right action from right motives, it naturally follows that a concreated holiness is an impossible thing. No fair exegesis of Gen. i. 26, or any other text of the Bible, requires us to believe that righteousness and true holiness are intended to be taught in it, and the facts in the case prove that they are not intended. If it should be said that though Adam was of course created before he acted, yet he was, in his creation, endued with righteousness and true holiness, and out of the holy affections must spring only holy or right motives, which would determine his will to right action, and therefore he was truly endued with true holiness. It is sufficient to remark that if the philosophy that puts the will under the causative dominion of the motive, and the motive under the control of the moral feelings, be true, then one of two facts logically follows:

1. God is the author of sin, or there is no such thing as sin in the universe. The advocates of this philosophy are at liberty to accept whichever horn of the dilemma they may prefer.

2. The idea of a probation is inconsistent with the assumption of a concreated holiness. If man was created with true holiness, why put him on probation at all? If possessed of true holiness, could the Creator require anything more than true holiness? Could the law require more than this, or could his own obedience make what was true any truer? Could human acts better or in any way improve the handiwork of God? Why then was

the first man put on probation? If it should be said he was put on probation in order to be confirmed in holiness, it is pertinent to reply that according to the theory his own obedience had no power or tendency to confirm his holiness ; on the contrary, his confirmation, if it had transpired at all, would have been by a sovereign judicial act of his creator. That is, his own acts of obedience could not confirm him, but his confirmation must be by a judicial act of his creator. And if his confirmation must be by a sovereign judicial act, why was he not then judicially confirmed at once and without probation?

If he was created in righteousness and true holiness, and none but God could confirm him in holiness, why was not his creation and confirmation in holiness immediate, or from the beginning?

According to the theory this was altogether possible and would have been almost infinitely beneficent, because it would have excluded forever the possibility of sin and all its resultant evils from our world, and would have superceded the necessity of the whole scheme of redemption through the suffering and death of Jesus Christ.

On this assumption of a concreated holiness and judicial confirmation, embracing the first man and all his posterity, a probation seems to be, not only unnecessary, but well-nigh the worst method possible for the human race. It also bears hard on the divine administration as may be shown elsewhere.

3. The hypothesis of a necessitated holiness is contradictory of the fundamental principles of a

moral government, and is therefore an absurdity. A physical and moral government are radically different in two respects. They differ in their subjects, and then in their modes of government and administration.

The physical world, consisting only of inert matter, is under the irresistible control of physical causation—relentless necessity reigns over all. The moral world, comprising all rational and accountable creatures, is not governed by laws of physical causation, or by necessity of any kind, but by moral power, sometimes properly called moral suasion. That is, by the power of truth, by appeals addressed to the intelligence, in the interest of the right and good. Matter and mind are fundamentally different in essence and characteristics and equally different in the mode of government to which the creator has subjected them. It is just as possible to govern the physical world by moral suasion as it is to govern the moral world by physical force, or by necessity of any sort. It is accordingly as possible to cause a mountain to move by moral suasion as to cause a mind to put forth a morally responsible act or a holy or a sinful act by physical or necessitating force. Of course it is possible for Omnipotence to act upon the mind so as to necessitate any act or course of action he may choose.

The necessitating power may be in accord with the inclinations of the mind or contrary to them, it matters not which. But if the mind acts under necessity then the act, so far as the mind is concerned, has no moral character, is neither right nor

wrong, because the mind is not the agent or actor, but merely the instrument, God, or the necessitating power, is the author. That necessitated acts are grounds of moral accountability is one of the vagaries of one of the schools of philosophy. All men, even the advocates of moral necessity, practically acknowledge that freedom is necessary to accountability. No one would think of punishing an agent for an act known to be necessitated. The Bible recognizes this principle from beginning to end. Holy men of God, moved by the Holy Ghost, wrote the sacred scriptures. These men were only the organs of revelation. The Holy Ghost—God—is the author. If what they thus wrote is true, it is not their merit; if false, it is not their vice. As to the truthfulness or untruthfulness of their writings, they are in no sense responsible. Why? Because they spake and wrote from necessity.

Just so far as they could have had any voluntary control over the matter the work would have been human, not divine. It is also equally possible for God to make the minds of bad men the instruments of his will. So he used Balaam, necessitating him to bless Israel when he wished to curse him. So he compelled Saul and his soldier and Caiphas to prophecy, and so he caused Balaam's ass to rebuke his master. In all these cases the right thing was done, *but doing the right thing* was nothing to the credit of Balaam or Saul or Caiphas. Why? Because their acts were divinely necessitated. God was the author, and they the passive instruments.

Another class of facts illustrates the same princi-

ple in relation to wrong (wicked) acts. Pharaoh ordered the slaughter of the male children of the Hebrews. Herod the Great, ordered the male children of Bethlehem under two years old to be put to death. Herod Antipas ordered John the Baptist to be beheaded. Neither of these tyrants laid violent hands upon any of these innocent parties. They are, however, adjudged guilty both by the laws of God and man, because they were the real authors of the bloody deeds; while the executioners are adjudged innocent, because they acted under necessity, not truly under such necessity as God or nature imposes on man, still, under a necessity sufficiently imperative to excuse them from the authorship of the crimes. Pharaoh and the Herods were responsible and guilty because they acted freely or without necessity. Their servants who did the blood-spilling were innocent, because they acted under necessity. No principle in ethics is better understood or more generally acted upon than this, that freedom from necessity is absolutely required to a virtuous or vicious action, to holiness or unholiness; on the contrary necessity exempts from all criminality, whatsoever may be the enormity of the deed. But as created holiness or virtue is a necessitated holiness, it is therefore incompatible with the fundamental principles of a moral government.

4. This will further appear from the fact that a necessitated holiness is a contradiction in terms. Any proposition involving such a combination of terms is self-destructive.

As we have just seen, moral qualities are predi-

cable of free acts only, but holiness, virtue, etc., are moral acts, and are therefore impossible as qualities in necessitated acts or states. We would as well talk of pleasant harm or vicious virtue and unrighteous holiness. The ideas symbolized are mutually repugnant and self-destructive. I will close this paragraph with a question from the late Albert Taylor Bledsoe, who was one of the most acute thinkers America has ever produced. In his theodicy, p. 193, he says: "As contradictions are impossible in themselves, so to say that God could perform them would not be to magnify his power, but to expose our own absurdity. When we affirm that Omnipotence cannot cause a thing to be and not to be at the same time, or cannot make two and two equal to five, we do not set limits to it, we simply declare that such things are not the objects of power. A circle cannot be made to possess the qualities of a square, nor a square the qualities of a circle. Infinite power cannot confer the properties of one of these figures upon the other, not because it is less than infinite power, but because it is not within the nature or province, or dominion of power, to perform such things, to embody such inherent and immutable absurdities in an actual existence. . . If God should cause virtue to exist in the breast of a moral agent he would work a contradiction. In other words, the production of virtue by any extraneous agency is one of those impossible conceits, one of those inherent absurdities, which lie quite beyond the sphere of light in which the divine Omnipotence moves, and has no existence except

in the outer darkness of a lawless imagination, or in the dim regions of error, in which the true nature of moral goodness has never been seen."

Finally, if a necessitated virtue is in the nature of things possible, or if virtue is properly a product of divine Omnipotence, as is the creation of the earth or sun or the human body or the human mind, then we should expect God, whose essence is love, to exclude sin forever from his dominion as the abominable thing that he hates, and to fill all departments of his intelligent creation with virtue and highest happiness.

Let it be assumed that in all newly created minds, as was Adam's and the angels', the possibility of virtue is of necessity the possibility of vice, or that the rudiments or potentialities of moral character in such minds may, by voluntary action, be developed into either a virtuous or vicious character, and that a moral government is, from its inherent nature, liable to moral evil. Virtue and vice, holiness and unholiness, are the alternative possibilities of such a mind. Virtue and vice are predicable only of creatures possessed of intelligence, sensibility, and freedom. Without intelligence there could be no apprehension of moral distinctions, no knowledge of right and wrong. Without knowledge or thought there could be no sensibility, because sensibility is always conditioned upon perception. But without sensibility there could be no motive to action, because action is always conditioned upon motive. Hence without intelligence there could be no motive, no volition, no virtue, no

vice, no moral character, good or bad. But we cannot predicate either virtue or vice of mere intelligence. Our knowledge may be valuable or worthless, but we cannot say it is either virtuous or vicious, holy or unholy. The intelligence is purely passive. It simply receives what the senses and rational intuitions pour into it. What it thus receives is neither its merit or demerit, neither its virtue nor vice. We must not forget to discriminate between the intelligence and the mind or man. The man may be responsible both for the measure and quality of his knowledge.

But this is only because it is the proper function of the will to direct the attention of the perceptive faculties, so as to enlarge the area of knowledge, and so as to determine the character of the knowledge thus acquired. Of this act of attention or of the will, moral qualities may be predicated, as right or wrong, but of the knowledge itself we cannot predicate moral quality, though it may be profitable or unprofitable. To do so is to confound an act and its consequences. The same thing is true of the sensibility. It, too, is passive. It does not originate action, but passively receives impressions made upon it through the intelligence. Whatever influence the feelings exert upon the will is only a transmitted influence that originated outside of the sensibilities themselves. The sensibilities, like the intelligence, in so far as they are not under the control of the voluntary power, are in themselves neither virtuous nor vicious. Every thought produces a corresponding emotion or moves the sensibilities.

But our thoughts are involuntary, and the corresponding emotions are equally so. Here, again, we must discriminate between the abstract feelings and the will, which is capable of exerting an influence over them as it does over the intelligence in determining their measure and quality. We cannot, therefore, predicate virtuousness or viciousness of sensibilities or feelings only so far as they are voluntary, or rather, the virtue or the vice connected with the voluntary feelings lies in the will and not in the sensibility itself. Quite otherwise is it in regard to the will. Its action is conditioned upon motive, but it does not, like the intelligence and sensibility, act only as acted upon, but originates actions. The occasion of its activity is furnished through the intelligence and sensibility, but as we have seen, the will is capable of reaction upon these faculties of the mind and cannot therefore be under their dominion, and is not by them or any other means put under the laws of causation. Its acts are not caused but are themselves self-originated and causative. The human mind is in regard to its own acts, like the Divine mind, free.

If the acts of the Divine mind are under the laws of causation, or are in any way necessitated by a force within or without, then God is not God, but only a link in the chain of causation. If the Divine mind acts necessarily then, of course, the universe is a thing of necessity and nothing could be different from what it is and all moral distinctions are myths. If the Divine mind acts freely and not from necessity then it was possible for the universe not

to be ; but as it does exist it must be a thing of choice, and a moral world is a possible thing. If the human mind was created in the image of the divine Mind, as we are told it was, then it is certain it is free in its limited sphere, in exactly the same sense in which the Divine mind is free ; for if this is not true then the human mind is wanting in the most essential feature of the Divine image, to-wit, true freedom or the power to originate action. We have previously seen that a concreated holiness or a necessitated holiness is an impossible thing, a contradiction in terms. The same is true of sin or vice in any of its possible forms. But if a concreated holiness is an impossible thing because it would be antecedent to all voluntary action, and if a necessitated holiness is also impossible because it would destroy the most vital characteristics of a moral agent, then it necessarily follows that if creature holiness exists at all, it must be the product of the creature will. Holiness or virtue is predicable both of the act and the actor, but not in the same sense. A holy act consists in doing or purposing to do the right thing from the right motive. This is the highest possible form of holiness or virtue. But every moral act, whether virtuous or vicious, exerts a reflex influence upon the agent and in this way, by an unbroken series, virtuous acts and habits are formed, and under the operation of the law of habit the agent becomes less and still less liable to vice or sin until the habit of virtue, growing stronger as time rolls on, and temptation after temptation is resisted, is confirmed, that is, becomes so strong that

no adverse influence to which the moral creature is subject can break it. In this way I suppose the holy angels were confirmed in holiness and rendered indefectible. In this way I suppose Adam' would have developed his native innocence into positive virtue and would have been confirmed in holiness had he chosen the right instead of the wrong.

If this does not give substantially the genesis, the true and only possible genesis, of creature virtue and creature vice, then it must be confessed I have studied the Bible and the philosophy of human character to little purpose. Let it be distinctly borne in mind that the process or *genesis* commences not with the intelligence nor with the sensibility, though they are both necessary to volition, but with the will. How many right acts of the will it would require to form an invincible habit of obedience in a newly created mind, free from all bias to wrong, I have no means of knowing. Obedience on the part of such a mind I suppose would be rendered with the greatest ease so long as it might not be assailed by strong temptation. In the absence of temptation I suppose defection would be highly improbable if not impossible. But the exclusion of such a mind from temptation would be as inconceivable and absurd as a concreated or necessitated holiness, for if there were no evil spirits to suggest the temptation, as was the case with Eve in Eden, and with Christ in the wilderness, yet the activities of the mind itself would be altogether sufficient to furnish the temptation. Nor would it be possible for the creator to deprive the mind of becoming its own

tempter without depriving it of the attributes of a moral agent. Hence we have no account of any orders of intelligent creatures that have not been subject to temptation. Satan, or the first fallen angel, was self-tempted because there were no evil spirits to tempt him, and we are authorized from this fact to believe that any newly created intelligence has innate power of creating sin without any external seductive agency. Eve's defection was facilitated by the suggestion of the serpent in the garden, and Adam's by Eve. Christ's temptation is attributed to the devil. All were tempted, and all doubtless had power to resist the temptation and obey God ; else they were the hopeless and helpless victims of a remorseless despotism. (I hesitate to speculate concerning our Savior's human nature. It is enough to know that with the fallen angels, with Adam and Eve, was the power to obey.)

Adam was, of course, obedient until he was assaulted with the temptation presented by the serpent, and this was probably the first temptation he ever encountered. But this obedience was so nearly a mere surrender to his natural inclinations as scarcely to require a distinct and sharply defined act of his will, and such obedience would, I suppose, partake more of the character of innocence than of virtue. But with the subtle temptation came the real conflict, when he was by his circumstances forced to a voluntary decision of the fearful question, whether he would obey God or yield to the tempter.

Obedience, to be such as the law requires, must

be something more than such as results from mere inclination without any conscious and well defined act of the will put forth in deference to the rule of duty. That kind of obedience that results in the confirmation of the agent in a state of indefectible holiness includes the power to resist all temptations that can be presented to the mind, that is, the power of full surrender of the whole man to God and a settled purpose of resistance to evil in every form. This confirmation is ethical, relates to the state of the intelligence, the sensibility, and the will, and not a mere judicial act of the divine Mind. The judicial theory of confirmation, either in sin or holiness, is without authority from the Bible, there being, so far as I know, not a word that authorizes it from Genesis to Revelation. In my judgment, it is also entirely contrary to science and subversive of the fundamental principles of the moral government of God. It is at best a sort of theological crotchet, designed to meet the exigencies of an unphilosophical scheme of moral government.

But it is impossible to know how many acts of obedience are required to so form the habit of obedience, as to render the newly created agent proof against all temptations, and therefore indefectible. It is very evident, on the contrary, that one single and premeditated act of disobedience is sufficient to confirm such an agent in a state of sin. This results from two facts, one legal, and the other moral.

I. The nature of the law is such as requires per-

sonal and perpetual obedience, so that the transgressor cannot atone for his offense.

2. By the act of the transgressor his heart is alienated from God, and he is made a servant of sin or a child of sin by his wicked works. Hence he is unable to reconcile himself to its authority.

From what has been said it must be apparent to all, that intelligence, sensibility, and will are indispensable attributes of a moral agent; that all such creatures, and none others, are capable of virtue and vice, and therefore proper subjects of moral government; also that all newly created minds that are capable of virtue are capable of vice, or that the possibility of virtue is the possibility of vice. The power not to sin is the power to sin. The power to sin is the power not to sin. By way of illustration, it may be said that the sensibility is the power alike of pleasure or pain. Hence the possibility of pleasure is the possibility of pain. To give the capacity of one is to give the capacity of the other. To destroy one capacity is to destroy the other capacity.

CHAPTER XI.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

It would be supremely absurd, not to say wicked, for any finite mind to pretend to a rational and full comprehension of the ways of God and his providence. When science and religion have thrown their concentrated light upon the dark problem of evil we see only enough to assure us of our own ignorance and utter inability to bring the mighty problem to a satisfactory solution. In fact, when we fix our attention on any form of existence, whether physical or spiritual, and attempt to trace it in all of its relations we soon find ourselves in a maze of darkness which we cannot dissipate, and we feel compelled to be content with a very limited amount of knowledge, even of the simplest and most familiar phenomena. From the Bible and nature, however, we may be able to form some general conclusions that may serve as guides and boundaries to our speculations concerning natural, as well as moral, evils. Among these general conclusions or judgments I will name the following:

That the God and author of the physical and moral world exercises absolute sovereignty over all his works. This he does in such a way that the prerogatives of sovereignty never trespass upon the claims of his universal fatherhood. As Governor and Father his justice and parental love never collide. In fact justice and benevolence may be re-

garded as different phases of the divine goodness; for an unjust administrator is necessarily destitute of true benevolence and an unbenevolent administrator cannot be just. If this is true it then follows as a moral impossibility for even divine Sovereignty to institute a government over accountable creatures which is not, both in its physical and moral aspect, designed for the highest good of the subjects, or in which the good of the subjects is not made potentially identical with the glory of the governor. In the light of these facts, which no intelligent optimist will call in question, we conclude that all evil in such a government is foreign to its designs, and if it exists at all must be the result of some abnormal action on the part of the subjects. It is hardly necessary to say that every moral government, from its essential nature, is liable to this abnormal action and hence to moral evil. This abnormal action and consequent moral evil can originate nowhere except in the voluntary action of the subject of the government. This moral evil does not directly or indirectly change anything in the exterior physical world, nor anything fundamental in the nature of the sinner. It does, however, subordinate his physical and intellectual powers to the purposes of evil and at the same time sadly changes his ethical relations to the exterior world. Hence I think it is true that sin is the only source of moral evil and the subjective source of physical evil. By this last statement I mean that if moral evil had not entered our world the laws of the physical world would have been attended

with the same phenomena that now attend them. These would not have been of the nature of evil at all and would not have been so esteemed. Even a natural death or a change of state would have probably been esteemed a good rather than an evil, even as it often is now so esteemed. In the providence of the allwise and benevolent Ruler, in our present sinful state, thousands of events occur which, considered apart from their actual consequences, are felt to be great evils. But if estimated in connection with their consequences prove that they are not great evils but great blessings. I feel quite safe in saying all physical events that occur independently of human agency are, when considered in their possible consequences, blessings in disguise. We in the meantime blindly esteem them great evils. Even individual and national sins are often overruled for good. The wrath of man is often made to praise God, not that there is any possible good in sin in itself or as a means. But God in his goodness makes it an occasion of blessing, in some way, to somebody, thus verifying the truth that where sin abounds grace much more abounds. This fact I think is exemplified in a most wonderful manner in relation to Adam's sin. In connection with the above statement I wish to lay down a few general propositions touching this subject. They are not as fully expressed as they might be, but they cover a part at least of this vast field.

1. Physical death, as a deprivation of animal life and a change of state, is natural to man, and as such is not a supernatural visitation.

2. All that is deeply distressful in physical disease or death, or the accessories of death, are the results of the violation of natural laws, and may be indirectly or remotely the results of sin somewhere.


3. That all painful anxiety and apprehensions concerning the future are the result of conscious sin. This is the sting of death; its source is not physical, but moral.

4. Neither physical death nor physical evil of any kind is in strict propriety of terms moral retributive punishment, i. e., punishment in exact accordance both in measure and kind with the committed sins or their punishment, i. e., punishment flowing necessarily out of the sins themselves, and as enduring as the mind itself.

5. All physical evil is providential and strictly administrative in character, and not retributive. It is always temporary, and, when strictly judicial, always arbitrary, on the part of the divine Administrator, i. e., it has no natural connection with the nature of the sins committed. Hence the evil may come in the form of sickness, plague, pestilence, wind, fire, flood, earthquakes, famines, or war.

By way of illustrating these two kinds of punishment, I may refer you to the Antedeluvians and Sodomites, both judicially and administratively destroyed. The judgments were arbitrary and temporary, but now they suffer retribution proper. This comes to them through the laws of their mind, and must be as durable as the mind itself.

This is the worm that dieth not, the unquenchable fire, the vengeance of eternal fire.



UCSB LIBRARY

X-25090

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



A 000 490 105 4

